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Technically Bankrupt 
Brook E. Gotberg* 
What is the difference between a robot and a lawyer?  The answer is 
not a joke, and may soon be a matter of great urgency for attorneys, as the 
legal field attempts to adjust to disruptive technologies that are likely to 
permanently alter the way that law is practiced throughout the United States.  
The consequences for failing to adjust to technological disruption for any 
industry, as demonstrated in recent years by big-name, bankrupt companies, 
can be disastrous.  Legal tools found in chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 
are largely intended to assist debtors in reorganizing their business affairs, 
preserving value by shedding unprofitable business activities and 
redirecting resources to more profitable venues.  However, these tools grow 
less effective as companies become more insolvent, and catching up on 
technological advancement becomes more difficult the farther a company 
falls behind.  Law firms face an additional incentive to adjust to technology 
early; although they may file for bankruptcy like other businesses, they have 
historically struggled to reorganize due in large part to the ability and 
propensity of firm asset—the attorneys themselves—to simply leave the 
company.  Accordingly, law firms, faced with an array of new and disruptive 
technologies, should draw on the lessons of prior industry failures and make 
adjustments swiftly, before finding themselves “technically” bankrupt. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Advances in technology can bring about significant changes.  In 
addition to the positive outcomes typically observed with technological 
breakthroughs, such as the faster, easier, and more efficient provision of 
goods and services, such advances can also be highly disruptive.1  In 
particular, these new technologies can have the effect of severely devaluing 
old technologies, and by extension, old ways of doing business.  Capital and 
human resources dedicated to implementing older forms of technology that 
were previously essential to company production can go from being valuable 
assets to costly liabilities in a relatively brief span of time. 
 
 
 
 1  See James Manyika et al., Disruptive technologies: Advances that will transform life, 
business, and the global economy, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (May 2013), http://www.mc
kinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/disruptive-technologies.   
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Technological disruption is an inevitable reality for every industry and 
an increasingly frequent observation in recent years.2  As technological 
methods such as automation, robotics, data storage, and artificial intelligence 
improve their ability to accomplish tasks faster, more accurately, and more 
efficiently, providers of goods and services will need to adjust to the 
changing technological landscape.  Rapidly, the provision of less efficient, 
less accurate, or otherwise less desirable products will become a losing 
proposition and companies will need to change with the market in order to 
stay in business.  This is as true for law firms as it is for any other industry 
and, for reasons described below, the pressure to respond to evolving 
technology is particularly relevant for big law firms. 
Businesses and industries are often slow to realize that innovation and 
adjustment to technological advances is necessary—that it was necessary 
months or even years prior—and that failure to adjust in the appropriate time 
frame has had devastating consequences for long-term profitability.  For 
many companies, such tardy realization sparks the need for a bankruptcy 
filing as a last-ditch effort to preserve the business as a going concern.  
Bankruptcy proceedings can provide valuable tools that are intended to 
enable a struggling business to right itself, shedding unprofitable ventures 
and obtaining fresh capital infusions to invest in updated technology.  These 
proceedings, accessed through chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, establish 
the creation of a bankruptcy estate.3  The debtor, acting as trustee of the estate 
(commonly referred to as the debtor in possession or DIP) is able to negotiate 
with creditors using the leverage of bankruptcy protection, which includes a 
prohibition against creditors’ attempts to collect.4  Ideally, through 
negotiations in bankruptcy overseen by a bankruptcy judge, a debtor and its 
creditors can come to an agreement through which the debtor may restructure 
and continue on a more profitable path, arising from the ashes of 
unprofitability like the fabled phoenix. 
However, as demonstrated by noteworthy bankruptcy filings in recent 
years, a delayed response to technological innovation can create obstacles to 
long-term profitability that not even powerful bankruptcy tools and 
sympathetic bankruptcy judges can overcome.5  Waiting too long to 
innovate, to readjust, or even to file for bankruptcy can and has proved fatal 
to companies that once were household names, such as Blockbuster LLC and 
 
 2  HENRY C. LUCAS, JR., THE SEARCH FOR SURVIVAL: LESSONS FROM DISRUPTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 4 (2012) (observing that compared with previous disruptive periods, the 
discontinuity introduced by technological disruption is likely to be a permanent state in the 
economy).   
 3  See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).   
 4  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 1101 (2012); see also discussion infra note 53 and 
accompanying text.   
 5  See discussion infra note 184 and accompanying text.   
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Borders Group, Inc.  Even companies that can survive a bankruptcy 
provoked by delayed response to technological disruption, such as Eastman 
Kodak Company, can be permanently altered and face an uncertain future. 
The legal profession, with its long history, its reputation for risk-
aversion, and its love of precedent, is generally viewed as an industry that is 
perpetually slow to adapt to technological advances.6  While the practice of 
law may be different from the sale of books, the rental of movies, or the 
production of film, it is in no way immune from the forces of technical 
progress that can and will shape the industry, with or without the consent of 
practitioners.  Recent developments in technology, especially the 
development of artificial intelligence,7 can and will have an impact on how 
law is practiced and how legal services are rendered.8 
This is especially true for law firms employing over 100 attorneys, 
commonly referred to as “BigLaw” firms.9  Although they comprise a 
relatively small proportion of the legal industry, BigLaw firms and 
perceptions surrounding them have a disproportionate impact on the 
 
 6  See, e.g., Ellie Margolis & Kristen Murray, Using Information Literacy to Prepare 
Practice-Ready Graduates, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 6 (2016) (“the legal profession has the 
reputation of being conservative and slow to change in general”); Timothy J. Toohey, Beyond 
Technophobia: Lawyers’ Ethical and Legal Obligations to Monitor Evolving Technology and 
Security Risks, 21 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 9, 4 (2015). 
 7  Used here, the reference to artificial intelligence (also known as AI) is to “weak” AI, 
through which machines are able to accomplish tasks performed by humans, rather than 
“strong” AI, which implies the ability to think like a human by making ethical judgments, 
applying symbolic reasoning, or managing social situations.  As of yet, strong AI is found 
only in works of fiction.  See Monika Hengstler, Ellen Enkel & Selina Duelli, Applied 
Artificial Intelligence and Trust—The Case of Autonomous Vehicles and Medical Assistance 
Devices, TECH. FORECASTING & SOCIAL CHANGE 105 (2016).  But see Anthony J. Casey & 
Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, 
Working Paper No. 550, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693826 (imagining a world in 
which laws are precisely tailored using technological advances and predictive technology to 
establish precise directives for any given factual scenario).   
 8  See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts (Mar. 1, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2927459 
(suggesting that predictive capabilities created by big data and artificial intelligence will allow 
parties to draft contracts that permit automatic analytics to fill in contract details to arrive at 
the parties’ desired outcomes).  But see Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers?: 
Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law 4  (Nov. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2701092 (concluding, based on a 
technical analysis, that automation has a less significant impact on the demand for lawyers’ 
time than popular accounts suggest); Steve Lohr, I, Robot, Esq.? Not Just Yet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 20, 2017, at B1.   
 9  Although a term of art subject to various interpretations, “BigLaw” generally refers to 
large and typically prestigious law firms employing at least 100 attorneys, which pay market 
rates to their associates.  “BigLaw” positions are accordingly highly desired.  See e.g., Alison 
Monahan, How to Get a BigLaw Job: Understanding the Basics of BigLaw, BALANCE (June 
9, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/how-to-get-a-biglaw-job-2164672.   
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American legal culture.10  In many ways, BigLaw firms shape expectations 
regarding attorney salary, hours, and practice, despite the fact that the 
average attorney performs strikingly different functions and makes 
substantially less than the typical BigLaw attorney.  BigLaw firms are 
particularly vulnerable to technological advances because many of these 
advances work to remove the advantages of being big.  In other words, 
developments in artificial intelligence make it possible for a single attorney, 
using the appropriate software, to conduct legal research and review factual 
records faster and more accurately than a dozen BigLaw partners and 
associates.  This reality severely undermines the BigLaw model, and will at 
a minimum require an adjustment of priorities in training and using attorneys 
within BigLaw firms. 
The lessons of previously well-known and outwardly successful 
companies that have failed, in large part because they adjusted to 
technological disruption too late in the game, would suggest that BigLaw 
should not delay in responding to technological advances if it wishes to 
remain a feasible economic model.  In fact, BigLaw has an even greater 
incentive than companies in other more capital-intensive industries to 
respond before too much time passes.  This is because bankruptcy 
proceedings, typically viewed as the last resort for companies, have proved 
almost universally fatal for large law firms.11  Although it may be 
conceivable for a company that has delayed response to technological 
innovations to “catch up” through bankruptcy proceedings, law firms have 
historically been unable to do so.12  The provision of legal services is indeed 
different from the sale of goods and the manufacturing of products, but not 
because the legal field is somehow inoculated from technological disruption.  
Instead, the differences between law firms and bookstores, movie rental 
conglomerates, and film manufacturers simply limits the comparative 
usefulness of a bankruptcy remedy.  This is all the more reason why law 
firms should take heed early, to adjust while there is time to do so, and not 
to rely on bankruptcy proceedings as a last-ditch effort to change course. 
This Article operates to some extent as a cautionary tale for all members 
of the legal profession, but most particularly for large law firms.  Part II 
identifies some of the technological disruptions currently facing the legal 
 
 10  See, e.g., Jordan Weissman, Why the Fall of Big Law Matters, ATLANTIC (July 23, 
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/07/why-the-fall-of-big-law-
matters/278040/ (suggesting BigLaw drove most of the growth in the legal profession in the 
years leading up to 2008).   
 11  See John Morley, Why Law Firms Collapse 1 (Yale Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for 
Studies in Law, Econ. & Public Policy Research Paper No. 521, Mar. 11, 2015), https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580616 (“Law firms don’t just go bankrupt—they 
collapse.”).   
 12  Id. at 1–2.   
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community and looks ahead to the possible (if not probable) technological 
advances yet to come.  Part III briefly explains how companies faced with 
technological disruption may respond using legal tools available through 
federal bankruptcy proceedings and how these tools can be helpful.  Part IV 
demonstrates the limitations of bankruptcy proceedings, often a company’s 
last resort, to rehabilitate companies facing obsolescence by virtue of 
technological advance.  This Part also briefly describes the bankruptcy 
proceedings of three well-known and highly respected companies and 
identifies generally applicable lessons drawn from their experiences.  Part V 
argues that the lessons derived from these bankruptcies, combined with the 
historical experience of law firms in bankruptcy, signal the need for law 
firms to respond early to technological disruption in order to avoid possible 
collapse. 
II. DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
The headlines are eye-catching, but the prospect for many lawyers is 
terrifying: Law Firm Retains a Robot with Powers of Attorney;13 U.S. Law 
Firm ‘Hires’ Robot-Lawyer;14 Billable Milliseconds?  Meet Ross, Lawyer of 
the Future.15  Are attorneys truly about to be replaced by robots or artificial 
intelligence?  Although the consensus appears to be, “not anytime soon,”16 
there is a general expectation that technology will advance in a direction that 
favors increasing use of artificial intelligence and computer software 
programs to accomplish tasks previously performed exclusively by 
attorneys.  Some practitioners are already taking advantage of technology to 
assist in tasks such as document review, legal research, and even writing 
briefs.  Current trends suggest that these technologies will only improve in 
speed and accuracy, leading to the assumption that use of these technologies 
will only increase with time.  The following section describes some of the 
more prevalent or newsworthy developments. 
A. eDiscovery 
The development of electronic record-keeping was a mixed blessing for 
the legal field.  The ability of computer servers, internet pages, and handheld 
devices to preserve and reproduce potentially relevant information vastly 
 
 13  Karen Turner, Law Firm Retains a Robot with Powers of Attorney, WASH. POST, May 
23, 2016, at A11.   
 14  Warren May, U.S. Law Firm ‘Hires’ Robot-Lawyer, Ross; He May Not Come into the 
Office, but Toronto-Created Ross can do an Articling Student’s Job, TORONTO STAR, May 20, 
2016, at GT6.   
 15  Jeff Gray, Billable Milliseconds?  Meet Ross, Lawyer of the Future, GLOBE AND MAIL 
(Toronto), Dec. 12, 2014, at B1.   
 16  See Lohr, supra note 8.   
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expanded the universe of discoverable documents and applicable due 
diligence in any given legal matter.  This introduced an added layer of 
complexity for lawyers, but also dramatically increased their workload by 
increasing the information to be requested and reviewed for both litigation 
and transactional purposes.17  The added workload created a need for a larger 
number of attorneys to work on cases just to manage the increased volume 
of paper to be sifted through and flagged as privileged, relevant to litigation, 
or potentially problematic for deal terms. 
Reviewing documents is a tedious, unpleasant task, typically assigned 
in the larger firms to the most junior associates or even contract attorneys.  
Those conscripted into document review have long felt that it is a task that a 
trained monkey could do.  Accordingly, it came as little surprise to many that 
one of the earliest technological developments in the legal field was the 
ability to better search and filter documents.  As software becomes 
increasingly powerful, it may soon be the case, if it is not already, that 
computer programs will become more effective than human professionals in 
locating potentially relevant or privileged information. 
These programs have the added advantage of being able to “read” 
documents faster, more continuously, and at a higher consistency rate than 
the biggest, best, and most skilled team of attorneys.  For example, COIN, a 
program JPMorgan Chase & Co. adopted in June of 2016, has recently 
boasted the ability to review commercial loan agreements for errors, 
accomplishing 360,000 hours of review work in a single year.18  As described 
in a recent news story, “[t]he [COIN] software reviews documents in 
seconds, is less error-prone and never asks for vacation.”19  Given the ability 
of computers to perform consistently and efficiently in a way that humans 
could never match, it is only a matter of time before repetitious tasks like 
document review, even though historically performed by educated 
professionals, will be accomplished by machines instead of humans.20 
 
 17  See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning 
Civil Procedure System, 90 OR. L. REV. 993, 996 (2012) (“Most recently, electronic record 
keeping made it possible to discover the previously undiscoverable—albeit at considerable 
burdens of time and expense—thereby suggesting a need for a different balancing among the 
competing interests in discovery.”).  
 18  Hugh Son, JPMorgan Software Does in Seconds What Took Lawyers 360,000 Hours, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2017, 7:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-
28/jpmorgan-marshals-an-army-of-developers-to-automate-high-finance (last updated Feb. 
28, 2017, 7:24 AM).  
 19  Id.   
 20  Although perhaps less inspiring, it is somewhat amusing to imagine a mighty standoff 
between a law firm’s most productive associate and a program such as COIN, in the spirit of 
the ballad of John Henry.  See William Grimes, Taking Swings at a Myth, With John Henry 
the Man, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, at E9 (observing that the John Henry behind the legend 
likely died of silicosis, a lung disease prompted by the inhalation of silicon dust).  One 
supposes that the associate would surrender long before the computer broke down, although 
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B. Chatbots and LegalZoom 
Although pro se representation is nothing new, recent developments 
have provided greater access and assistance to individuals seeking legal help 
without hiring a live attorney.  Such help may be provided through the use 
of chatbots, which are simple artificial intelligence programs that can answer 
questions through text or even via webcam.  Chatbots can trace their origins 
to the Turing test, which was established by Alan Turing, one of the pioneers 
of computing.  Turing suggested that a computer’s intelligence could be 
tested based on how well it could trick humans into thinking it was itself a 
human based on its responses to questions.21  In recent years, chatbots and 
similar devices have been used to assist individuals in defending themselves 
in legal proceedings.  Perhaps the most famous example involves traffic 
tickets. 
Joshua Browder was a teenager with no formal legal training22 when he 
began programming DoNotPay, a website that assists motorists in appealing 
parking tickets by providing a list of potential defenses for the user to select23 
and an online form for users to enter the factual basis for their defenses.  The 
program generates a letter of appeal, incorporating the options selected by 
the user.  One could imagine that this sort of technology, which is both 
relatively easy to set up and to duplicate, will improve over time to cover an 
increasing number of applications, potentially implicating legal work outside 
traffic court. 
A more established and well-known company in the realm of pro se 
legal representation, with perhaps a less memorable back story, is 
LegalZoom.  LegalZoom is an online company that provides customers with 
assistance in preparing legal documents such as business documents, wills, 
and divorce filings, through use of software that guides customers to fill out 
forms themselves, informed by prompts from the software based on previous 
responses.  The company has been challenged on the grounds that it engages 
in the unauthorized practice of law, but it has largely settled these suits while 
 
suffering a fatal stroke after several days of review would not be inconceivable.   
 21  See Holly Ryan, When the robots are smarter than us, N.Z. HERALD (Oct. 14, 2016, 
6:12 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=1172
7587 (noting that “[i]n 2014, a computer successfully imitated a 13-year-old boy in a text 
conversation, fooling a number of judges”).   
 22  Browder did have an extensive history with parking tickets.  Helen Weathers & Beth 
Hale, Meet the boy genius who can get you off a parking fine, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 1, 2016, 5:51 
PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3381510/Meet-boy-genius-parking-fine-Josh
ua-18-fed-getting-tickets-set-website-help-escape-penalties.html (last updated Jan. 2, 2016, 
3:42 AM).   
 23  Examples include “My car was stolen” and “There was a medical emergency,” as well 
as options for missing or incorrect details on the ticket.  See DoNotPay, http://powerful-
journey-59211.herokuapp.com/list/332 (last visited Sept. 25, 2017). 
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maintaining operations.24  To the extent lawyers would otherwise be hired to 
perform such tasks, their automation poses a disruption that could 
conceivably spread to other areas, including more general litigation 
proceedings. 
C. Artificial Intelligence 
The most striking and newsworthy development of the past few years 
has been the rise of artificial intelligence in accomplishing legal work.  The 
recent unveiling of a program touted as the first “robot lawyer,” ROSS 
Intelligence or ROSS, made headlines.25  Modeled after Watson, the artificial 
intelligence that beat former winner Ken Jennings on Jeopardy in 2011, 
ROSS was first adopted commercially in 2016 in the bankruptcy practice 
area of Baker & Hostetler.26  As of the drafting of this article, ROSS is being 
used by, or is in trial with, at least seventeen law firms, and is in trial with 
several law schools.27  Although conceptually related to the Westlaw and 
Lexis search engines, with which it will likely compete, ROSS claims to be 
different in terms of its ability to apply “machine learning,” i.e., permitting 
the program to become more adept in its responses to legal questions through 
user feedback.28 
 
 24  See George Leef, Why The Legal Profession Says LegalZoom Is Illegal, FORBES (Oct. 
14, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2014/10/14/why-the-legal-
profession-says-legalzoom-is-illegal/#16d79de95663; Terry Carter, LegalZoom resolves 
$10.5M antitrust suit against North Carolina State Bar, ABA J. (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_resolves_10.5m_antitrust_suit_against_
north_carolina_state_bar.   
 25  See, e.g., Karen Turner, Meet ‘Ross,’ the newly hired legal robot, WASH. POST (May 
16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-ross-
the-newly-hired-legal-robot/?utm_term=.777b593298cc.  
 26  Debra Cassens Weiss, In a first, a BigLaw firm announces it will use artificial 
intelligence in one of its practice areas, ABA J. (May 9, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/in_a_first_a_biglaw_firm_announces_it_will_use_artificial_intelligence_in_o/.  
 27  See Susan Beck, Inside ROSS: What Artificial Intelligence Means for Your Firm, 
LAW.COM (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/09/28/inside-ross-what-
artificial-intelligence-means-for-your-firm/?slreturn=20170627142627; see also ROSS 
Intelligence, Do more than humanly possible, (2017), http://www.rossintelligence.com/ 
(listing law firms using ROSS).   
 28  See Brian Baxter, ROSS Intelligence Lands Another Law Firm Client, AM. LAW. (Oct. 
6, 2016), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202769384977/ROSS-Intelligence-Lands-
Another-Law-Firm-Client?slreturn=20170824105226. (ROSS co-founder Andrew Arruda 
has acknowledged the competition posed by Westlaw and Lexis, both of which have a far 
longer history in the legal field and a much larger subscriber base.  However, he has also 
observed, “When you’re a big company and you’ve built your product around old technology, 
and a new technology comes out, to change and adapt, you have to gut your underlying 
technology.  Let’s not forget that most companies in the legal research space started as 
publishing companies, not as technology companies.  That gives us a great competitive 
edge.”).  See also Beck, supra note 25.  User interface with ROSS would be familiar to most 
people; one would need to simply type a question into the search bar, as if searching Google, 
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Moreover, ROSS is being constantly developed to include additional 
features, providing services that have traditionally been the realm of junior 
associates.  One of the most intriguing features is ROSS’s ability to write a 
memo on any given legal topic and deliver it by email.  Although the memos 
currently are less polished than could be provided by a skilled associate,29 
the technology continues to advance and improve.  Indeed, the program has 
a built-in feedback loop, whereby attorneys may comment on the quality of 
the ROSS memo, permitting the program to learn which products are 
satisfactory and which require further fine-tuning.  The memo feature, while 
still in the early stages of development, has the capacity to take over a 
significant amount of work currently done by associates, particularly if 
expanded to include drafting of briefs, contracts, discovery documents, and 
more.  There is no reason to doubt that artificial intelligence will eventually 
expand in that direction.  In an era of rapidly developing technology, 
“eventually” may be a matter of only a few years, if not a few months.30 
Artificial intelligence has developed for transactional attorneys as well.  
Kira Systems, a perhaps less-touted but equally disruptive technology, was 
founded by Noah Waisbeg, a former BigLaw associate who looked for ways 
that artificial intelligence could facilitate the review of contracts as part of 
due diligence.31  Kira Systems operates to extract vital information from 
documents faster and more accurately than human review could ever hope 
to accomplish.  One of Kira Systems’s clients reported efficiency gains of 
between forty and seventy percent.32  Deloitte, perhaps the most well-known 
client of Kira Systems, has widely implemented the program in its day-to-
day operations.33 
 
 
and, within seconds, applicable rulings with appropriately summarized passages that are ready 
for quoting or inclusion in a brief are available on the screen.   
 29  See Beck, supra note 27.   
 30  Within the past several months, artificial intelligence has made progress that few dared 
to predict.  See Cade Metz, In a Huge Breakthrough, Google’s AI Beats a Top Player at the 
Game of Go, WIRED (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/in-a-huge-break
through-googles-ai-beats-a-top-player-at-the-game-of-go/ (“Earlier this month, top AI 
experts outside of Google questioned whether a breakthrough could occur anytime soon, and 
as recently as last year, many believed another decade would pass before a machine could 
beat the top humans [at Go].”).   
 31  Artificial Lawyer, The Kira Systems Story, ARTIFICIAL LAW. (Aug. 16, 2016), 
https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2016/08/16/the-kira-systems-story/.   
 32  Eric Rosenbaum, Can elite law firms survive the rise of artificial intelligence? The 
jury is still out, CNBC (Nov. 17, 2016, 2:31 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/17/can-cash
-cow-of-elite-legal-firms-survive-ai-the-jury-is-still-out.html.   
 33  Id.   
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D. BigLaw’s Vulnerability 
It would be premature to suggest that the advances documented above 
signal the end of lawyers as we know it, although others have so claimed.34  
This article also does not suggest that these advancements, in isolation, will 
have the effect of systematically destroying demand for BigLaw work.  
Instead, the argument here is more modest: technological developments will 
require a reevaluation of how large law firms function, particularly how they 
train their associates, bill their time, and market their products.  Law firms 
that do not reevaluate and adjust to technologies run the substantial risk of 
becoming uncompetitive and too large and unwieldly to make the necessary 
adjustments to meet a changing market demand.  In light of the technological 
innovations described above, BigLaw is likely to require a significant 
business overhaul, in large part because of the sheer size of its firms. 
BigLaw firms earn the title by being big, although compared to law 
firms half a century ago, they are huge, enormous, even gargantuan.  For 
example, in 1960, the largest firm in the United States had only 169 
lawyers.35  In the year 2016, 17 law firms had over 1,000 U.S.-based 
attorneys, with thousands more overseas.36  There are various explanations 
for why firms have expanded so significantly in recent years, the most 
plausible being the perceived need for a large number of attorneys to service 
large clients on large matters.37  Large matters involve, among other things, 
large populations of documents, complex issues requiring research, and a 
significant amount of drafting, alongside a healthy amount of strategizing, 
negotiating, and planning. 
 
 34  See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF 
LEGAL SERVICES (Oxford Univ. Press 2010); Paul Lippe & Daniel Martin Katz, 10 Predictions 
About How IBM’s Watson Will Impact the Legal Profession, ABA J. (Oct. 2, 2014), 
http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/10_predictions_about_how_ibms_watson_wil
l_impact (“Once we have fully artificial intelligence enhanced programs like LegalZoom, 
there will be no need for lawyers, aside from the highly specialized and expensive large-law-
firm variety.”).  See also Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 
752 (2010) (arguing that Big Law operates on a basically precarious business model, and 
demonstrating the need for changes to that model).  But see Bernard A. Burk & David 
McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New 
Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 101 (2011) (rejecting Ribstein’s claim that the large 
American law firm is dying, even while acknowledging that the form is “brittle” and subject 
to change).  
 35  ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 273–74 (1993).   
 36  For a discussion of how law firms have grown and changed over the past 50 years, see 
Burk & McGowan, supra note 34, at 11.   
 37  See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 34, at 758 (observing that legal work often involves a 
peak load problem, where clients may require a significant amount of work on short notice, 
making it difficult to outsource portions of the work to multiple smaller firms); Burk & 
McGowan, supra note 34, at 57–58.   
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Law firms can currently afford to employ a large number of attorneys 
on large client matters because those matters produce large fees.  Most law 
firms use the billable hour model to charge clients.  Under this model, 
attorneys keep track of their time, usually in six- or fifteen-minute 
increments, and report their totals along with a brief explanation of the work 
performed during that time period.  Attorneys charge an hourly rate 
depending on their experience and skill, often tracking the number of years 
out of law school and partnership status.  Clients pay for the minutes worked 
by each attorney at that attorney’s going rate, rather than the overall product 
obtained.38  Although the billable hour is an easy and simple method for 
calculating the cost of legal services, it is also highly problematic.  For one 
thing, it encourages inefficiency, as the more the number of hours worked 
on a product, the larger the revenue.  This incentive is exacerbated by internal 
firm policies that reward associates for exceeding a certain number of 
billable hours in a year, or punish associates who fail to meet that benchmark 
number.  This effect is further distorted when there is insufficient work to 
keep all associates occupied, encouraging associates to pad their hours 
further, take longer to finish products, or otherwise spend more time in the 
office absent pressing work or meaningful tasks.39 
Indeed, Biglaw associates have a reputation for being deeply unhappy, 
despite earning highly competitive salaries.  The most obvious source of 
discontent is the high number of hours associates are expected to dedicate to 
their craft in order to maximize revenue from the billable hour model.  
Another, less obvious problem arises from the structure of the firms 
themselves—in particular, their size and managerial makeup.  Most big firms 
operate on a model under which each partner is supported by multiple 
associates.  Partners partake in firm profits, whereas associates are paid a set 
salary, determined by the voting partners.  Partners are able to increase their 
own incomes by maximizing the profit of the associates.  This has typically 
been accomplished by hiring more associates and requiring them to work 
additional hours under the billable hour model.  In order to get the highest 
level of profits, BigLaw firms will typically only take on significant client 
matters that will support high hourly rates over a significant number of hours, 
keeping multiple associates busy on small slices of the case or transaction.40 
 
 38  There are, of course, exceptions to this rule.  Some firms will bill on a product model, 
although the quoted cost often incorporates the amount of time worked, and there are cases 
taken on a contingency basis.   
 39  As observed by one critic, “[n]othing requires leaders to use the billable hour regime 
that causes so much misery, but almost all big firms and many others have adhered to it. . . . 
Clients detest its perverse rewards for inefficiency; associates crumble under its pressures. . . . 
Long ago, clients should have rebelled.  For some reason, they still don’t.”  STEVEN J. HARPER, 
THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRISIS 171 (2013).   
 40  Id. at 77–78 (“The regime [of high associate to partner ratios, high hourly rates, and 
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Because associates typically work on small sections of a larger case, 
they are significantly less likely to be involved in the types of experiences 
that attracted them to the law in the first place.  For example, large cases 
rarely go to trial, and when they do, junior associates are typically only 
tangentially involved with courtroom experiences or client interactions.  In 
some firms, associates may compete with each other for the ability to 
participate in meaningful experiences, creating an even more difficult work 
environment, as associates must out-work (or out-ingratiate) each other in 
order to merit what work is available.41  Opportunities for mentorship with 
partners are also diminished as the ratio of associates to partners increases.  
Taken together, these factors go a long way towards explaining the 
dissatisfaction of many associates, who frequently leave BigLaw after only 
a few years.  BigLaw firms, for their part, recognize associate dissatisfaction, 
but rather than ameliorate it, simply build associate turnover into their hiring 
and staffing models.42 
It is generally accepted that technology can and will permit attorneys to 
accomplish many of the tasks accomplished by junior associates faster, 
cheaper, and more accurately as technology improves.  The ability of 
artificial intelligence such as ROSS to eventually provide responses to legal 
research questions more quickly, succinctly, and accurately than even the 
most skilled associate calls into question the value of paying flesh-and-blood 
associates to perform such tasks.43  As the artificial intelligence improves, it 
will make even less sense to hire attorneys except to interact with the 
computer software, perhaps through editing, proofreading, or otherwise 
providing feedback for more polished products later on.44  Although 
 
high billable hours] yields predictable results.  Only large client matters will support 
associates’ high hourly rates.  Small cases and disputes that enabled an earlier generation of 
lawyers to develop courtroom and client experiences have dropped away.”).   
 41  Id. at 59 (“The prevailing model of the big law firm bears much of the blame for 
increasing dissatisfaction among attorneys in such institutions.  Too often, the model deprives 
lawyers of autonomy, creates an environment that rewards selfish behavior, and does little to 
promote collegiality.  As for their daily tasks, most big-firm attorneys spend the vast majority 
of their time on small slices of large cases or transactions.  Those matters can be financially 
lucrative and professionally rewarding for the firm’s senior partners, but junior attorneys often 
feel little connection to an overall mission.”).   
 42  For some, this means simply maintaining a significant associate/partner ratio.  See id. 
at 180 (“Between 1985 and 2010, the average leverage ratio for the Am Law 50 firms doubled, 
from 1.76 to 3.54.”).   
 43  This is the promise of “machine learning.”  See Arthur L. Samuel, Some Studies in 
Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers, 3 IBM J. OF RESEARCH & DEV. 210, 211 
(1959), https://www.cs.virginia.edu/~evans/greatworks/samuel1959.pdf (suggesting that 
programming computers to learn from their own experiences will allow computers to greatly 
outperform the average person and eliminate the need for detailed programming).   
 44  As predicted by Professor Ryan Calo at the University of Washington School of Law, 
“[e]ventually, I bet not using these systems will come to be viewed as antiquated and even 
irresponsible, like writing a brief on a typewriter.”  Karen Turner, Meet ‘Ross,’ the newly 
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promoters of ROSS, as well as its early adopters, have stressed that the 
product is not intended to “replace” attorneys, but rather “to help them move 
faster, learn faster, and continually improve,”45 such technology will 
necessarily change how attorneys work, how they spend their time, and how 
they can justify billable hours, particularly in BigLaw firms.46 
One of the principal effects of technology is to undermine the value of 
being big.47  With machines accomplishing more historically time-
consuming tasks, fewer individuals are required to manage cases.  As one 
commentator observed, “[l]arge law firms have no advantage whatsoever 
when it comes to technology.”48  Another predicted, “[t]here are now so 
many ways in which corporate clients can cut legal costs that the very 
expensive legal services of large law firms are going to be called for in a 
shrinking number of situations.”49  There is already evidence that corporate 
clients are turning to sources other than large law firms to satisfy their legal 
servicing needs.  A recent study examining the productivity of 51 Am Law 
100 firms,50 44 Am Law Second 100 firms,51 and 57 additional midsize firms 
indicated that lawyer productivity, measured by hours billed, has suffered a 
steady decline over the past 10 years.52  Overall, billable hours have fallen 
roughly 10%, although much more significantly for non-equity partners and 
senior or staff counsel.53  Even associates, whose numbers have been 
 
hired legal robot, WASH. POST (May 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-ross-the-newly-hired-legal-robot/?utm_term=.08e1940769
85.   
 45  Id.   
 46  This reassessment is intended by Ross founders.  See The Atlantic, Watson Takes the 
Stand, ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com/sponsored/ibm-transformation-of-business/
watson-takes-the-stand/283/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2017) (“‘People are reassessing the 
structure in place which revolves around the billable hour,’ says Andrew Arruda, another of 
the ROSS co-founders. ‘A lot of clients have refused to pay for the time spent doing research. 
They see it as part of what you should be doing anyway.’”).  As one adopter of Kira Systems 
explained, “It’s not the death of the law firm partnership model, but it will change over time.  
No one can say how, exactly, but we have to think about how we price and work.” 
Rosenbaum, supra note 32.   
 47  See Ribstein, supra note 34, at 761 (observing that technical advances have eroded the 
advantages of BigLaw).   
 48  Valerie Katz, Size Matters: Small Firms and Big Technology, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 
3, 2011), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/03/size-matters-small-firms-and-big-technology/.   
 49  Elizabeth G. Olson, Big Law has a shrinkage problem, FORTUNE (Jun. 26, 2013), 
http://fortune.com/2013/06/26/big-law-has-a-shrinkage-problem/?iid=sr-link10.   
 50  This term refers to the ranking of law firms by gross revenue as published by The 
American Lawyer.  See, e.g., The American Lawyer, The Am Law 100: Firms Ranked by 
Gross Revenue, (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202784616627.  
 51  See supra note 48.   
 52  See GEO. LAW: CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ET AL., 2017 REPORT 
ON THE STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET, http://legalexecutiveinstitute.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/01/2017-Report-on-the-State-of-the-Legal-Market.pdf.   
 53  Id.   
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significantly reduced over the past 10 years, experienced a drop in 
productivity.  In the meantime, firms have compensated for the lack of 
productivity by raising their rates, which has then resulted in greater client 
pushback and a decreasing rate of collection realization.54  It should be 
obvious to most observers that a pattern in which firms maintain profits by 
charging more for less work is not sustainable, particularly in a competitive 
market. 
Law firms, unlike other industries, do not enjoy economies of scale 
based on their size.  As reported by one consulting firm, “[l]arger firms 
almost always spend more per lawyer on staffing, occupancy, equipment, 
promotion, malpractice and other non-personnel insurance coverages, office 
supplies and other expenses than do smaller firms.”55  It may not be the case 
that large law firms will disappear overnight, but it seems very likely that the 
BigLaw model will soon lose its competitive edge if it does not adjust to 
technological advances.56  Smaller firms may be able to accomplish the same 
amount of work as BigLaw firms by using machines and a fewer number of 
attorneys, particularly if those attorneys are better trained and more 
motivated.57 
This observation has ramifications for law firms, lawyers, and law 
schools as well.  If computers are able to better accomplish much of what 
junior associates used to do, lawyers must be better at engaging in tasks that 
computers are not yet able to accomplish in order to compete with the 
machines.  Incoming associates will need to be trained and prepared to 
engage more in the “classical” practice of law: client interaction, negotiation 
with opposing counsel, and court appearances.  In addition, associates will 
need to become skilled in monitoring technological product—editing 
computer-generated memos and briefs, and providing feedback through the 
user interface.  Further, associates will need to learn (or re-learn) skills 
associated with being “human.”58  Although artificial intelligence is 
 
 54  Id.   
 55  HARPER, supra note 39, at 75.  See also Ribstein, supra note 34, at 772 (observing that 
multiple recent law firm bankruptcies can be attributed in part to an over commitment to office 
space and an inability to repay loans).  See also Burk & McGowan, supra note 34, at 70 
(noting that large law firms may introduce diseconomies of scale in the way of multiple 
conflicts of interest, friction inherent in management, and coordination problems).   
 56  See Burk & McGowan, supra note 34, at 86 (“[I]f the client is going to demand that a 
firm use contract lawyers or a third party for document review anyway, who cares whether 
the lawyers that do the core legal work have 10 lawyer colleagues or 1000?”).   
 57  There is some evidence to suggest that BigLaw firms may already be looking to reduce 
associate to partner ratios.  See id. at 94 n.221.   
 58  See Matthew Kay, Robot Lawyers: How Humans Can Fight Back, TIMES (U.K.) (May 
26, 2016), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/robot-lawyers-how-human-ones-can-fight-
back-8qmwqlfwx (“[I]n an age where real-life lawyers are starting to have to differentiate 
themselves from new cyborg competitors, they need to focus on polishing up their human 
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constantly improving in its ability to interact with humans,59 the best 
computers are still not able to appear in court or to engage in “the practice of 
law” as defined by most legal standards.  Absent a major breakthrough in 
how technology is used, attorneys will remain necessary for higher-level 
strategy and skill, and this, in addition to their ability to successfully 
implement a strategic approach with clients, opponents, and the court, is 
where their value still lies. 
There is much work to be done on how law firms can and should adjust 
to new technology—far more than can be covered in this Article.  But 
perhaps the more pressing concern is how to convince firms and practicing 
attorneys to begin adjustment now.  Extensive training or retraining of 
associates is likely to be costly and difficult.  Why should BigLaw firms 
attempt such an endeavor when profits are not currently threatened, and the 
technology, although promising, is not yet able to fully replicate a good 
associate’s work product?  The answer is tied up in the history of firms that 
face technological disruption.  The time to adjust is early on, because waiting 
can be disastrous, if not fatal. 
III. RESPONSIVE TOOLS FOR TECHNOLOGY-INDUCED FINANCIAL OR 
ECONOMIC DISTRESS60 
By virtue of the inherent costs associated with restructuring a business 
model or making any other major change, companies are typically loathe to 
do so until faced with outside pressures, such as a decrease in earnings or a 
slump in stock price.  If the economic pressure is not significant, then 
businesses may be able to respond incrementally, spreading the costs of 
restructuring over time.  If adjustment is not particularly expensive, because 
it need not be particularly large or particularly significant, then companies 
may also borrow, offer additional securities, or otherwise increase capital 
sufficient to take the company in a new direction.  However, when significant 
changes must be made in response to severe pressure, when costs are high 
and the necessary adjustments are overdue, companies must typically resort 
to more drastic measures, up to and including bankruptcy proceedings.  
Bankruptcy proceedings are very useful when companies cannot otherwise 
acquire the working capital they need to make adjustments due to being 
overleveraged or otherwise lacking in credit worthiness.  As explained 
below, such companies, as debtors, have the ability to restructure old debt 
 
skills, particularly their emotional intelligence”).   
 59  See Tom Simonite, Customer Service Chatbots Are About to Become Frighteningly 
Realistic, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603895/
customer-service-chatbots-are-about-to-become-frighteningly-realistic/.   
 60  See the discussion on the distinction between economic and financial distress infra 
Part IV.   
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and to attract new investment through bankruptcy tools.  The longer 
companies wait to respond to technological disruption, the more likely they 
are to require bankruptcy proceedings in order to access outstanding capital 
and restructure obligations.  What is more, if companies wait too long to file, 
the bankruptcy itself is less likely to be successful. 
A bankruptcy filing is a legal proceeding in the federal courts that has 
the effect of superseding the state law rights of creditors.  The primary 
advantage for bankruptcy filers is the ability to coerce creditors into 
negotiation.  A debtor cannot compel creditors to accept less than they are 
owed pursuant to state law, even though creditors may voluntarily accept a 
lesser amount.  In bankruptcy, debtors may propose plans that force 
creditors, broadly defined as anyone with an interest in the debtor, to accept 
less than they would otherwise be rightfully owed, with the difference 
discharged as a matter of law.  The ability to discharge debt is a primary 
distinguishing factor between state law remedies and bankruptcy, one 
actually captured in the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution.  
Pursuant to the Contracts Clause,61 states cannot pass laws “impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts,” which has been interpreted to prohibit state 
insolvency laws that discharge debt.62  Also prohibited by the Contracts 
Clause are coerced alterations to the creditor’s agreement with the debtor, 
including the extension of time to repay debt, the refusal to perform under a 
contract, or any other alteration of terms.  Outside of bankruptcy, a debtor is 
at the mercy of its creditors with regards to performance under the contract. 
Accordingly, for many businesses, chapter 11 is a mechanism for 
forcing negotiations with creditors, and for permitting debtors to continue to 
manage and retain an ownership interest, often after previous efforts to 
negotiate have failed.  In this regard, bankruptcy provides valuable tools to 
debtors that are unavailable in other contexts.  These tools are intended to 
facilitate a debtor’s recuperation in a way that maximizes the return for 
stakeholders—creditors, investors, and other parties in interest.63  Although 
 
 61  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.   
 62  See generally Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819); 7 C.J.S. Attachment § 
506 (2016).  For an interesting discussion on how a dispute over the Contracts Clause might 
be considered the most important case of its millennium, see also Robert E. Shapiro, Back to 
the Future: Ogden v. Saunders, 27 LITIG. 73, 74 (2001). 
 63  The extent to which chapter 11 policy should recognize the impact that a business’s 
bankruptcy should have on individuals who are not creditors is a matter of wide dispute among 
scholars.  Compare, e.g., Matthew Bruckner, The Virtue in Bankruptcy, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
233, 269 (2013) (“One of Chapter 11’s primary purposes is to preserve jobs.”); Richard V. 
Butler & Scott M. Gilpatric, A Re-Examination of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy, 2 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 269, 281–82 (1994) (noting that a business’s going concern value 
is only partly captured by the recovery it can provide for its creditors, and also comprises 
relationships with non-creditor third parties, suggesting an independent bankruptcy interest in 
preserving this value); Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing 
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there are too many of such tools to permit a careful indexing of them all—
indeed, there are hornbooks and treatises dedicated to the topic—five stand 
out as particularly useful for businesses seeking to reorganize in chapter 11, 
particularly those attempting to respond to technological advances. 
A. The Automatic Stay 
The automatic stay is usually the first bankruptcy tool debtors actively 
use in their efforts to reorganize.  The automatic stay arises as a matter of 
law when a bankruptcy case is filed.64  The stay renders void or voidable65 
any action taken to commence, continue, or enforce an action against the 
debtor, or to obtain possession or a lien against the debtor’s property.66  
Creditors are accordingly prohibited from exercising their legal rights during 
the duration of the stay, even in cases where there is no dispute regarding 
those rights.67  Creditors may petition the court for relief from the automatic 
stay,68 which may be granted after notice and a hearing, but only upon a 
showing that: (1) the creditor’s interest in estate property is not adequately 
 
on the Outside Looking in, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 429, 439 (1998), and Elizabeth Warren, 
Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336 (1993) (arguing that 
reorganization produces substantial positive externalities such as maintaining employment, 
preserving the local tax base, and advancing community stability), with THOMAS H. JACKSON, 
THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 24 (1986) (arguing that bankruptcy law should 
be limited to concerns of how to maximize the value of a given pool of assets, not to how 
those assets should be distributed); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, 
and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822 (1987) (arguing that the 
rules determining loss distribution inside and outside bankruptcy should be the same, 
suggesting no independent policy interest in the continuation of a failing debtor), and 
CHRISTOPHER F. SYMES, STATUTORY PRIORITIES IN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF PREFERRED CREDITOR STATUS 70 (2008) (noting the dominance of the creditors’ 
bargain theory).   
 64  Both voluntary and involuntary, single and joint cases, give rise to the automatic stay.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).   
 65  There is a difference of opinion as to whether all actions taken in violation of the 
automatic stay are null and void ab initio or whether they must be voided by the court.  The 
majority takes the view that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are without legal 
effect, and cannot later be validated by a retroactive annulling of the automatic stay.  See 
CHARLES TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 246 (2d ed. 2009).   
 66  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  The automatic stay technically applies to “property of the 
estate,” rather than property of the debtor.  The filing of bankruptcy results in the creation of 
a bankruptcy estate, which generally consists of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).  Accordingly, it is technically incorrect, although practically 
accurate, to describe the automatic stay as applying to all the debtor’s property.   
 67  There are some exceptions to the automatic stay, found in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b).  These 
exceptions include the commencement of a criminal action against the debtor, the withholding 
of pension funds from a debtor’s wages, and eviction proceedings in a case involving 
residential property in which the lessor has obtained a judgment for possession, but do not 
include generic efforts to repossess personal property, foreclose on homes, or otherwise obtain 
judgments or liens.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b).   
 68  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).   
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protected;69 (2) the creditor should be allowed to move against a particular 
piece of property because the debtor has no equity in the property and it is 
not necessary to the debtor’s reorganization;70 or (3) the debtor has filed for 
bankruptcy as part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.71  
Accordingly, because of the “automatic” nature of the stay and the necessity 
for relief prior to taking action, whatever the underlying merits of the debt 
or the likelihood of success in reorganization, a bankrupt debtor is 
immediately afforded a period of “breathing room,” where creditors cannot 
take any action against the debtor to enforce the debt absent explicit 
permission from the court.72 
The benefits of the automatic stay to the debtor and the estate are 
immediate and obvious.  There are benefits to most creditors as well.  
Because the stay prohibits all actions by all creditors (with some exceptions 
as noted above), no creditor can improve his or her position at the expense 
of other creditors.  In the absence of a convincing reason justifying relief 
from the stay, all creditors must wait for the orderly distribution of the estate, 
either under the debtor’s plan of reorganization or through liquidation.  
Accordingly, state law rules that encourage a race to the spoils are preempted 
by bankruptcy procedure, and creditors can be reassured that no one may 
beat out the others as they all wait for the bankruptcy case to proceed. 
B. Executory Contracts 
A second powerful tool in the hands of a technologically bankrupt 
debtor is the ability to reject unprofitable contracts and terminate wasteful 
leases at an effective discount and, to some extent, on the debtor’s timetable.  
The act of filing for bankruptcy does not itself constitute a contractual 
breach, even if the contractual instrument says as much; ipso facto clauses 
purporting to terminate a debtor’s property interest upon bankruptcy filing 
are not enforceable in bankruptcy.73  Accordingly, contracts or leases that are 
determined to be outstanding or “executory”74 may be assumed or rejected 
 
 69  This argument is typically made in situations where the creditor has a security interest 
in collateral that is rapidly depreciating in value.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).   
 70 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).   
 71  The ability to lift the automatic stay under this provision is limited to those creditors 
with an interest in real property.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4).  The automatic stay may also be 
lifted without cause 90 days after filing in cases where the debtor’s estate consists primarily 
or exclusively of a single piece of real property, which generates substantially all of the gross 
income and on which no substantial business is being conducted.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(3), 
101(51B).  In certain situations involving repeat filers, the automatic stay may terminate early 
or may not go into effect at all.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)–(4).   
 72  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).   
 73  See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B).   
 74  The debate over the “executoriness” of contracts is a quagmire that the author declines 
to enter here.  See, e.g., Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: 
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at the will of the debtor,75 subject to court approval.  Although it is true that 
all parties to a contract are free to continue or breach the contract at any 
time,76 a debtor in bankruptcy has the advantage of treating the damages 
arising from any breach as though they arose prior to the bankruptcy filing.  
This means, of course, that the damages are considered pre-bankruptcy debt, 
which can be repaid over time pursuant to a plan of liquidation or 
reorganization, and discharged, in whole or in part, pursuant to that plan.77  
Furthermore, in cases where the debtor seeks to assume a contract or lease, 
any breach by the debtor in the days leading up to bankruptcy may be cured, 
and the debtor may assume the contract or lease as though the breach had not 
taken place.78 
The debtor is frequently afforded a significant period of time in which 
to decide whether or not to assume contracts and leases.  Although a trustee 
in chapter 7 must act within sixty days of the bankruptcy filing,79 in chapter 
11, the debtor may decline to assume or reject until confirmation of the plan 
of reorganization.80  There is no set time frame for plan confirmation, and 
the timeline may extend for a year or more, giving the debtor the luxury of 
time and the creditor the pain of uncertainty.81 
The ability to assume beneficial contracts, even those the debtor may 
have breached prior to filing, is an undoubtedly beneficial tool to a debtor 
seeking to shift resources towards more valuable aspects of its business.  But 
 
Understanding “Rejection”, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 850 (1988) (“[I]n several respects 
Countryman’s analysis has clouded rather than clarified the law.”); Vern Countryman, 
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 450 (1973) (noting that 
“[a]ll contracts to a greater or less extent are executory,” but asserting that such an expansive 
meaning cannot be applied in bankruptcy); Morris G. Shanker, Bankruptcy Asset Theory and 
its Application to Executory Contracts, 1992 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 3, 3 (describing the 
situation surrounding the executory contract section of the Bankruptcy Code as “one 
approaching legal chaos”); TABB, supra note 65, § 8.2.   
 75  The section refers to the powers of the trustee, but at least in chapter 11, the debtor in 
possession has all rights and powers of the trustee, accordingly the terms are practically 
synonymous.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), 1107(a).   
 76  The nature of contract permits individuals to breach their contractual agreements, but 
generally does not allow them to escape the consequences of that breach.  See Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897), reprinted in 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 991, 995 (1997) (“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that 
you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”).   
 77  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).   
 78  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1).   
 79  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1).  The trustee may also request additional time from the 
court, which the court may grant for cause shown.  Id.   
 80  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2).   
 81  See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529 (1984) (observing that the 
difference between the liquidation and reorganization proceedings justifies a difference in 
treatment for executory contracts, giving a debtor in reorganization greater latitude in deciding 
whether to assume or reject).   
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perhaps even more valuable is the ability to shed less profitable contracts and 
leases at a fraction of the cost under state law.  Although a debtor will be 
responsible for damages arising from the debtor’s breach of contract, these 
damages will be paid out at a fraction and discharged along with the debtor’s 
other unpaid debts.  This tool has permitted debtors to rid themselves of a 
myriad of unprofitable arrangements, ranging from future contracts to 
pension obligations.  In rejecting these agreements, a debtor will often 
transfer its own risk of loss onto its contracting partners, inflicting financial 
pain on individual creditors for the benefit of the debtor and its estate and, at 
least in theory, the creditors as a whole. 
C. Asset Sales 
A third advantage enjoyed by debtors in bankruptcy is the ability of the 
bankruptcy trustee82 to sell property of the estate free and clear of liens, 
typically in lieu of a foreclosure sale.  Frequently, both inside and outside of 
bankruptcy proceedings, an organization’s assets are encumbered by 
voluntary liens for the sake of obtaining financing, and occasionally by virtue 
of a judicial lien imposed by a court judgment against the debtor.  A lien 
grants the lienholder the first right to the proceeds of any sale of the property.  
For example, if a debtor’s estate included equipment encumbered by a 
security interest held by a bank, when the estate property was sold, the bank 
would have a first priority right over the proceeds, until the debtor’s debt to 
the bank was satisfied.  Similarly, if the debtor’s estate included inventory 
encumbered by a judicial lien entered in favor of a judgment creditor, when 
the inventory was sold, the judgment creditor would have a first priority right 
over the proceeds of the sale, until the judgment creditor’s debt was satisfied. 
More importantly, both the bank and the judgment creditor would 
continue to hold property rights securing their respective interests until those 
rights were extinguished by virtue of a foreclosure sale, or unless they 
authorized a sale free and clear of their interests.83  Such a continuation of 
rights permits secured creditors (a term typically used for those who reach a 
consensual agreement with the debtor) and lien creditors (those who acquire 
a judicial lien against the debtor) a degree of assurance that their interests 
will be protected in the collateral until the collateral is sold.  Outside of 
bankruptcy proceedings, if a debtor is in default to a secured creditor, or any 
time after a judicial lien has attached to collateral, the creditor holding the 
 
 82  In chapter 11, the trustee is more frequently the debtor in possession.  See supra note 
63.   
 83  See U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).  There are some 
exceptions to this rule, most notably for sales of goods in the ordinary course of business.  See 
U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).  In such cases, the buyer 
would take free and clear of the security interest even with knowledge that the security interest 
existed and was perfected.   
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lien may look to the collateral for satisfaction of its debt.  For secured 
creditors, the collateral may be repossessed and sold pursuant to judicial 
foreclosure, or through out-of-court proceedings in a “commercially 
reasonable” manner, with surplus proceeds remitted back to the debtor.84  For 
lien creditors, an officer of the court (typically the sheriff) conducts a sale of 
the property and transmits the proceeds to the creditor, again remitting any 
surplus to the debtor. 
While court oversight of such sales may discourage the debtor from 
absconding with sale proceeds, the nature of foreclosure sales also tends to 
dramatically depress the sale price.  Although the Supreme Court has 
presumed that the price received at a foreclosure sale constitutes “reasonably 
equivalent value” for the property, so long as all applicable state 
requirements have been met,85 in practice foreclosure sale prices are often 
“shockingly low.”86  As observed by one set of scholars, although many state 
courts will set aside foreclosure sales that “shock the conscience,” courts 
may be surprisingly hard to shock.87  The “commercial reasonableness” of a 
secured creditor’s sale of personal property may also be challenged by a 
debtor in court, although the standard does not require that the sale result in 
a price that satisfies “fair market value.”88  Further, a finding that the sale 
was not commercially reasonable does not unwind the sale; it only deprives 
the creditor of the right to a deficiency judgment.89  Accordingly, a debtor’s 
ability to maximize the sale value of encumbered assets is limited pursuant 
to state law. 
In contrast, bankruptcy proceedings may provide debtors and creditors 
with a sale mechanism that provides a greater return and fewer possibilities 
for a post hoc challenge.  Pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, a 
trustee or debtor in possession may sell estate assets outside of the ordinary 
 
 84  Non-judicial sale is typically reserved for personal, not real property.  See U.C.C. §§ 
9-610; 9-615(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).   
 85  See BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994) (“We deem, as the law has 
always deemed, that a fair and proper price, or a ‘reasonably equivalent value,’ for foreclosed 
property, is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of 
the State’s foreclosure law have been complied with.”).   
 86  LYNN M. LOPUCKI ET AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 61 (8th ed. 
2016).   
 87  Id.; see also First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Mo. 2012) 
(observing that Missouri has one of the strictest standards for setting aside sales, upholding 
prices that came to only 20% to 30% of the fair market value); Amalgamated Bank v. Superior 
Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 686, 689, 696 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (declining to set aside a foreclosure 
sale for irregularities with factual findings that a $6.5 million building was sold at foreclosure 
for $2,000); Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Hous. v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex. 1975) 
(affirming a foreclosure sale of property valued at $338,365 for $20,000 on the ground that 
there was no evidence of irregularity in the proceedings).   
 88  See U.C.C. § 9-627(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).   
 89  See U.C.C. § 9-626(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).   
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course of business upon approval of the bankruptcy court, after notice and 
opportunity for a hearing.90  These assets may be sold free and clear of 
preexisting liens in the time frame that suits the debtor, not the creditor.  By 
virtue of the automatic stay, debtors are afforded time to market the assets, 
permit inspection of those assets, and generate interest among multiple 
buyers.  The bankruptcy court provides a forum for auction of the assets, 
with oversight by the judge herself.  These sales, enjoying the oversight of 
the bankruptcy court, are generally viewed as less susceptible to legal 
challenge than a typical foreclosure or sale pursuant to the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  Given these advantages (marketing, inspection, and 
court oversight), bankruptcy sales may fetch a higher price than would the 
sale of the same assets in foreclosure.91  This is particularly true when assets 
may be sold as a group, or portions of the business sold as a going concern, 
permitting the preservation of value in the course of the sale itself.92 
In some cases, liens may actually be stripped from property, such that 
creditors who would have been treated as secured under state law find 
themselves unsecured in bankruptcy.  This typically occurs when creditors 
have failed to obtain perfection of their security interest prior to the 
bankruptcy filing.  Creditors who are unperfected at the time of filing, and 
in some cases, just before,93 are treated as unsecured creditors by virtue of 
the trustee’s “strong-arm” powers, which permit a trustee (or debtor in 
possession) to step in front of the security interest and distribute assets 
accordingly.94  Unlike secured creditors, unsecured creditors have no 
guaranteed interest in the proceeds of collateral.  Accordingly, the proceeds 
of any sale of unsecured assets may be used to assist in the debtor’s 
 
 90  See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(e) (providing that a hearing 
may be set “[i]f a timely objection is made,” suggesting that courts need not set a hearing 
without objection).   
 91  Challenges to the desirability of section 363 sales have largely focused on whether 
such sales produce a higher value than reorganization. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. 
Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (finding in a study comparing 
the sale of thirty public companies with the reorganization of 30 companies that companies 
sold for an average of 35% of book value compared, but reorganized for an average of 80% 
of book value); but see James J. White, Bankruptcy Noir, 106 MICH. L. REV. 691 (2008) 
(criticizing the methodology of the LoPucki & Doherty study as to the conclusions they draw 
from the evidence).   
 92  The advantages of a court sale described here are part of what has led many debtors to 
attempt a total liquidation of their businesses pursuant to section 363.  See Jared A. Wilkerson, 
Defending the Current State of Section 363 Sales, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591, 595–96 (2007).  
 93  For example, pursuant to bankruptcy preference law, perfection of a pre-existing 
security interest constitutes the transfer of value to or on behalf of a creditor, and can be 
avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 547.   
 94  In situations where personal exemptions are applicable (usually not in the corporate 
context) personal exemptions in property can also justify the stripping of even perfected 
judicial liens.  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).   
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reorganization, rather than being surrendered to satisfy the claims of the 
newly-unsecured creditor. 
D. DIP Financing 
A fourth bankruptcy advantage stems from the ability of bankruptcy 
proceedings to alter or undercut contractual agreements between parties, 
particularly, again, between a debtor and its secured creditors.  As a general 
matter, struggling companies require capital infusions to assist in 
restructuring, reorganizing, and revitalizing their businesses.  An unfortunate 
side product of being heavily indebted to the point of requiring a bankruptcy 
filing, is often a lack of cash reserves and an inability to borrow additional 
money.  Fortunately for debtors, bankruptcy law provides an opportunity to 
solicit additional funds, and the ability to offer additional incentives to 
would-be lenders that would be unavailable outside of bankruptcy. 
The simplest bankruptcy tool regarding post-petition financing is the 
ability to allow new lenders to take priority in repayment over old debt.95  
Post-petition extensions of credit are treated as administrative expenses of 
the bankruptcy estate, and receive top priority in repayment.96  If this is 
insufficient to attract new lenders, the court may also approve a lending 
arrangement whereby the debtor can grant the lender priority over all other 
administrative expenses, grant a security lien in unencumbered estate assets, 
and/or grant a so-called “priming lien” on already-encumbered assets, 
displacing pre-petition security interests.97  This ability provides a powerful 
incentive for pre-petition lenders to provide post-petition financing as well, 
or risk having their security interests downgraded to junior interests in 
collateral encumbered by post-petition liens. 
Other bankruptcy rules regarding a lender’s security interest work to 
backstop a debtor’s ability to obtain post-petition financing.  For example, 
bankruptcy law negates any after-acquired clause in a lender’s security 
agreement or financing statement, such that property acquired by the debtor 
after a bankruptcy filing within the description of the security agreement will 
nonetheless be free of the lender’s security interest.98  Although a secured 
creditor’s interest in the proceeds of collateral is preserved in bankruptcy, it 
is also subject to a bankruptcy court’s determination of whether bringing 
 
 95  See 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (2012).   
 96  See generally 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2012).  Administrative expenses do technically fall 
behind domestic support obligations, but there is a carve-out for administrative expenses 
incurred in the administration of assets used to pay such obligations.  See 11 U.S.C. § 
507(a)(1)(C).  In any event, domestic support obligations are usually inapplicable in corporate 
reorganizations.   
 97  See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) and (d).  Debtors may also, with court approval, grant post-
petition lenders a junior interest in encumbered property.   
 98  See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a).   
GOTBERG (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2017  10:54 AM 
2017] TECHNICALLY BANKRUPT 135 
assets into the banner of “proceeds” is consistent with “the equities of the 
case.”  Creditors also face the possibility that the court, although typically 
inclined to recognize such an interest in proceeds, could “order[] 
otherwise.”99 
E. Drawn Out and Reduced Repayment 
Finally, bankruptcy permits debtors to repay their debts, both secured 
and unsecured, over time, and also permits unsecured debts to be repaid at a 
reduced rate.  In chapter 11, the specific time period and amount for 
repayment is left to the debtor to propose, with creditors voting in favor of 
or against the debtor’s proposal and the court confirming the plan of 
reorganization based on that vote.  With creditor support, the debtor may 
propose a repayment plan stretching over years, if not decades.  Unsecured 
creditors may be paid mere pennies on the dollar for their claims.  In the 
meantime, the debtor can continue to function and operate the business. 
The principal constraints on a debtor’s proposed plan, aside from the 
creditor vote, are requirements that similarly-situated creditors receive 
similar treatment, that creditors who do not consent to the plan receive at 
least what they would have gotten in liquidation,100 that secured creditors are 
paid in full,101 that the plan is “fair and equitable,” 102 and that the plan is 
feasible.  If the debtor is unable to get all creditors103 to vote in favor of its 
plan, the debtor must also meet the “absolute priority” requirement.104  Under 
 
 99  See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also In re Cafeteria Operators, L.P., 299 B.R. 400, 410 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (“[T]he Court finds that the equities of this case warrant a finding 
that Bank Group’s security interest does not flow to all cash generated by Debtors . . . . To 
grant Bank Group a blanket lien on all of Debtors’ cash generated post-petition would 
represent a windfall to Bank Group, in the face of Debtors’ utilization of estate resources, i.e. 
the services of their employees, to increase the value of Bank Group’s collateral, and would 
unfairly deplete the funds available for general unsecured creditors.”).   
 100  This is a simplified explanation.  What the law actually requires is that any class of 
creditors that votes against the plan must receive what they would in a chapter 7 liquidation.  
Debtors divide creditors into classes for purposes of voting on the plan, subject to the 
constraint that all claims or interests in the class must be “substantially similar” to each other.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 1122.   
 101  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (2012).  Secured debts must be repaid via cash 
installments within five years, unless creditors have consented to alternative treatment under 
the plan.   
 102  See generally § 1129.   
 103  Again, this is a simplification.  The actual requirement is that the debtor get at least 
two-thirds in number and more than one-half in total claims within each class of creditors to 
vote in favor of the plan.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).   
 104  See § 1129(b).  This rule is subject to significant criticism for a variety of reasons.  
See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in 
Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 764 (2011) (arguing that the absolute priority rule 
eliminates the contractual rights of the junior creditor by collapsing all interest in future values 
of the company).   
GOTBERG (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2017  10:54 AM 
136 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:111 
absolute priority, creditors are ranked according to the priority of their rights 
under state law to the debtor’s assets, and no junior creditor is permitted to 
recover against those assets until more senior creditors are paid in full.  In 
practice, this means that equity will recover nothing unless creditors are 
repaid in full or voluntarily share a portion of their recovery.  These legal 
constraints on the plan of reorganization seek to strike the balance between 
preserving the interests of lenders and enabling a struggling debtor to 
regroup and succeed moving forward.  The laws are generally perceived as 
very generous to the debtor, and even more generous in implementation. 
Taken altogether, these tools, protections, and allowances in 
bankruptcy permit businesses both the space and the legal ability to 
accomplish value preservation, and in many situations, to re-chart a negative 
trajectory.  Chapter 11 is intended to give companies the opportunity to 
refocus their efforts on productive and profitable areas, expanding their 
operations where economically feasible and eliminating ventures proved to 
be unprofitable.  In cases of technological disruption, chapter 11 can assist 
businesses in shedding old, value-reducing mechanisms and investing in 
more profitable mechanisms.  Ideally, these adjustments should be made 
incrementally, before old technology becomes obsolete, to avoid extreme 
shocks to revenue or overhead.  Bankruptcy can be a tool of last resort in 
preserving a company if major adjustments become overdue, requiring a 
more extensive and costly overhaul. 
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF BANKRUPTCY  
Even the most useful bankruptcy tools,105 in the hands of skilled 
bankruptcy and insolvency professionals, cannot guarantee an outcome 
where the debtor will emerge intact from the bankruptcy.  In part, the success 
of a company in chapter 11 will depend on whether it suffers from economic 
distress, defined as weaknesses in the business model, or simply financial 
distress, defined as cash flow or leverage issues.  It is generally understood 
that companies with poor business models are more likely to fail rather than 
reorganize, although one type of distress can easily lead to the other.106  The 
 
 105  Bankruptcy policy in chapter 11 is largely concerned with how to make such tools 
more useful for reorganizing debtors without undermining the rights of creditors, a difficult 
balance.  See generally Michelle M. Harner, Final Report of the ABI Commission to Study the 
Reform of Chapter 11, AM. BANKR. INST. (2014), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context=books.   
 106  See, e.g., Lemma W. Senbet & Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate Financial Distress and 
Bankruptcy: A Survey, 5 FOUNDS. & TRENDS IN FIN. 243 (2010) (arguing that an efficient 
bankruptcy code would reorganize firms suffering from financial distress but liquidate firms 
suffering from economic distress); Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating 
Successful Failures, 66 FLA. L. REV. 205, 213 (2014) (noting that either type of distress may 
lead to the other).   
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failure to adjust to technological changes can cause economic distress, 
because the company’s goods and services become obsolete or lose their 
demand.  As a consequence, the company may then face financial distress.  
Accordingly, failure to act in a timely fashion can prove fatal for a company. 
Severe economic distress may necessitate a liquidation of the flawed 
business model rather than a restructuring.  However, weaknesses in the 
business model do not necessarily make liquidation a foregone conclusion, 
and it is possible for companies to successfully alter their business models, 
or “pivot” in time to save the company.107  The relief provided by bankruptcy 
might theoretically provide space for a company to pivot, although in 
practice this is rarely the case.  Companies are typically reluctant to file for 
bankruptcy, despite the advantages that bankruptcy proceedings can provide, 
until other means of reorganization have proved insufficient, or until it is 
effectively too late to reorganize at all.108 
It is not entirely clear why companies are so reluctant to file for 
bankruptcy. At least one study has concluded that such reluctance may stem 
from management’s perception that distress is temporary, or from 
management’s refusal to acknowledge the challenges facing the company.109  
Some may believe that the company can resolve its challenges pursuant to 
out-of-court workouts, and may be wary of the costs of bankruptcy or 
dubious of its benefits.110  It may be that decision makers view bankruptcy 
only as a liquidation mechanism, despite evidence of other companies that 
have emerged from a restructuring under chapter 11.  Perhaps companies 
seek to avoid the perceived stigma of a bankruptcy filing, believing (not 
without cause) that a filing will serve as a public admission that the company 
is struggling, with consequences that are likely to include a dramatic drop in 
stock price and increased scrutiny of its operations.111  Ultimately, these 
 
 107  Eric Ries, author of The Lean Startup (2011), coined this term to mean “a change in 
strategy without a change in vision.”  See Eric Ries, Pivot, don’t jump to a new vision, 
STARTUP LESSONS LEARNED BLOG (June 22, 2009), http://www.startuplessonslearned.com/
2009/06/pivot-dont-jump-to-new-vision.html; see also Network Languages, Eric Ries 
explains The Pivot, TEDED, https://ed.ted.com/on/7gLF8601.   
 108  See Harner & Griffin, supra note 106, at 208–10 (observing that management may be 
slow to consider restructuring discussions, and be particularly reluctant to file for bankruptcy 
because they view it as an “option of last resort”); Harner, supra note 105, at 12. 
 109  Harner & Griffin, supra note 106, at 236 n.118. 
 110  For example, it is a common perception that chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings are 
unnecessarily expensive and time consuming.  See Stephen J. Lubben, The Costs of Corporate 
Bankruptcy: How Little We Know (Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 2446663, June 
5, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2446663 (arguing that costs associated with chapter 11 
fees are regulated for historical reasons and not because they are necessarily disproportionate 
to the services provided).   
 111  But see Harner & Griffin, supra note 106, at 236 n.118 (finding in a study of 
restructuring professionals that less than 15% of clients who resisted filing for bankruptcy did 
so on account of the potential stigma associated with bankruptcy).   
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concerns amount to a self-fulfilling prophecy—reluctance to file for 
bankruptcy early enough to permit successful restructuring ensures that more 
companies, when they do file, will have done so too late. 
In the three cases listed below, large, profitable companies were unable 
to move quickly enough to take advantage of technological advances that 
fundamentally changed the way that the goods and services they supplied 
were demanded by customers and clients.  When customers ceased to shop 
for books in stores and started purchasing reading material through online 
stores or on digital media, Borders was too heavily invested in store fronts 
to respond successfully to the shift.  When customers stopped renting VHS 
tapes from stores and instead purchased DVDs or had them mailed directly 
to their homes, Blockbuster was too vested in its storefront service to 
successfully adjust its business model in the face of strong competition.  
Kodak became complacent in its profitable business model and neglected to 
act until it was too late to transition smoothly away from its flagship products 
to digital cameras.  Presumably, if each industry had adjusted its model 
earlier, before the technology moved out of its grasp, the outcome would 
have been different, and a chapter 11 reorganization would have been more 
successful or even avoidable altogether. 
A. Borders Bookstore: Retail Book Sales in the Era of E-Books and 
Online Purchasing 
Borders first gained its competitive advantage as a retail book store 
through employing its own type of sophisticated, cutting-edge technology.  
As a consequence, it was able to expand beyond its humble origins to become 
a household name.  At its height, it was the second-largest bookseller in 
America, after Barnes & Noble.112  However, within a few decades of 
Borders’ rise, the sale of books and printed materials dramatically changed 
with a confluence of technological advances, like the advent and popularity 
of eBooks and the ability to order books online.  Borders largely ignored 
these advances for a significant period of time, even turning over its online 
sales to a technological competitor—Amazon.  As a consequence, Borders 
was unable to recuperate when hit by the global economic crisis of 2008, 
such that even its chapter 11 bankruptcy filing proved insufficient to permit 
its ongoing survival. 
 
 112  CORPORATE DISASTERS: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY 49 (Miranda H. Ferrara 
& Michele P. LaMeau eds., Gale, Cengage Learning 2012).  Notably, Barnes & Noble, the 
only surviving major bookstore chain in the U.S., is facing its own struggles with reinvention 
in the era of Amazon.  See Paul R. La Monica, Barnes & Noble reeling as Amazon eats its 
lunch, CNN MONEY (Sept. 8, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/barnes-and-
noble-earnings-amazon/.   
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1. Beginnings 
Opened in 1971 by two brothers, Tom and Louis Borders, Borders 
Bookstore became competitive because of a software system developed by 
Louis that allowed the store to manage inventory and accurately project 
sales.113  By 1988, the brothers had turned management of the store over to 
Robert DiRomualdo, who oversaw the expansion of the company and the 
integration of music and movies into some of its stores, beginning in 1991.114  
In 1995, Borders Group, Inc. went public on the New York Stock 
Exchange.115  Borders’ early embrace of technology was responsible for 
much of its success.  As noted by one publisher at the time, “[t]he Borders 
inventory and reordering systems have been the envy of the industry.”116 
Borders continued to expand its physical storefronts, and launched its 
first online retail presence, Borders.com, in May of 1998.117  In November 
of 1999, Greg Josefowicz replaced DiRomualdo as CEO,118 and in August 
of 2001 made the crucial decision to contract to sell its products through 
Amazon, which had already been selling books online for about six years.119  
In retrospect, this decision was arguably the greatest single cause for 
Borders’ downfall, but at the time, Borders’ focus was on providing the 
largest selection of books for its brick-and-mortar storefronts.  In this regard, 
Borders was very successful, beating out Barnes & Noble in terms of 
selection and becoming known as the place to buy hard-to-find books.120 
 
 
 
 
 113  Nathan Bomey, Borders’ Rise and Fall: A Timeline of the Bookstore Chain’s 40-year 
History, ANN ARBOR NEWS (July 18, 2011), http://www.annarbor.com/business-review/
borders-rise-and-fall-a-timeline-of-the-bookstore-chains-40-year-history/.   
 114  CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112; Bomey, supra note 113.   
 115  Id.   
 116  Edwin McDowell, The Media Business; Revamping Set at Kmart Book Unit, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 30, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/30/business/the-media-business-
revamping-set-at-kmart-book-unit.html?scp=5&sq=borders%20group%20kmart&st=cse.   
 117  Bomey, supra note 113.   
 118  DiRomualdo had stepped down as CEO in November of 1998 in favor of Philip 
Pfeffer, who resigned less than a year later.  DiRomualdo replaced Pfeffer as CEO on a 
temporary basis. Bomey, supra note 113.   
 119  BRAD STONE, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF AMAZON 110 
(2013) (noting that while this deal helped Borders to overcome its blunder of building a single 
massive distribution facility rather than smaller, geographically dispersed warehouses, it 
“delayed a necessary education on an important new frontier and ceded the loyalty of 
[Borders’] customers to an aggressive upstart.”).   
 120  CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112.  
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2. Fallout of Technological Innovation 
The focus on brick-and-mortar stores would soon prove to be a bad 
investment,121 and Borders’ reluctance to make technological advances a 
priority would prove a losing strategy.  With the increasing ease of making 
online purchases, Borders’ focus on providing a wide selection at its large 
superstores became a liability.  In 2007, the company lost $157.4 million,122 
and stock shares plummeted in value.  In March of 2008, Borders attempted 
to boost its financial position by taking out a $42.5 million loan from 
Pershing Square Capital Management, due on April 15, 2009.123  In May of 
2008, Borders also severed its relationship with Amazon to launch its own 
e-commerce Web site, a remake of the original Borders.com.124  In a late 
move to catch up on a clear shift towards reading books in electronic format, 
Borders also attempted to market an e-reader to compete with Amazon’s 
Kindle and Barnes & Noble’s Nook.  Rather than develop its own product, 
Borders took partial ownership of a Canadian e-book company, Kobo.125  A 
decade behind its competitors, Borders fared poorly in its efforts.126 
Recognizing its shaky economic position, Borders attempted to market 
itself for sale as a going concern throughout 2008, without success.127  By 
this point, the global financial crisis had begun and Borders’ future was 
deeply uncertain.  Pershing Square granted a one-year extension on its 
loan,128 but Borders continued to post staggering losses.  Borders admitted 
to cash flow issues in early 2011, when it delayed payments to vendors and 
landlords in order to conserve cash.129  At this news, Professor John Pottow 
predicted Borders’ bankruptcy,130 which came roughly six weeks later on 
 
 121  CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 50 (“The company did not appear to 
understand how outdated the superstore model was becoming.”).   
 122  Bomey, supra note 113.   
 123  Bomey, supra note 113.   
 124  Steve Pepple, Borders hopes new e-commerce web site will help turn financial 
fortunes around, ANN ARBOR NEWS (May 27, 2008), http://blog.mlive.com/annarbornews/
2008/05/borders_hopes_new_ecommerce_we.html.   
 125   CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 50.   
 126  In his book on Amazon, Brad Stone reports that one Borders executive, speaking 
anonymously, reported the early version of Amazon was that it “was just another catalog—a 
version of Lands’ End.” STONE, supra note 119, at 276.  Borders’ refusal to take the threat 
from Amazon seriously undermined its ability to respond quickly enough.   
 127  Bomey, supra note 113.   
 128  Stefanie Murray, Borders reaches agreement with top shareholder for loan extension, 
ANN ARBOR NEWS (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.mlive.com/business/ann-arbor/index.ssf/
2009/03/borders_reaches_agreement_with.html.   
 129  Jim Milliot, Borders Delays January Payments, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Jan. 30, 2011), 
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/bookselling/article/45953-
borders-delays-january-payments.html?utm_source=Publishers+Weekly%27s+PW+Daily
&utm_campaign=7b83fb6a92-UA-15906914-1&utm_medium=email.   
 130  Nathan Bomey, Borders Group bankruptcy filing may be inevitable, University of 
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February 16, 2011.  At the time of filing, Borders operated 642 brick and 
mortar stores in the United States.131 
3. Bankruptcy 
In its chapter 11 filing, Borders listed its total assets at $1,275,430,500 
and overall debts of $1,293,112,600.  The top 30 unsecured creditors 
disclosed in the bankruptcy filings were all designated as “trade debt,” and 
consisted mostly of publishers like Penguin Putnam, Inc. (owed 
$41,118,914.47) and Simon & Schuster, Inc. (owed $33,757,444.75).132 
On the day of filing, Borders submitted an Emergency Motion seeking 
authorization to close and sell the assets of 200-336 stores.133  The proposal 
was to “cut costs by closing highly unprofitable stores and restructuring 
around a core group of favorably-performing stores.”134  Borders argued that 
such a move would “ensur[e its] continued and stabilized viability.”135  
Borders proposed that a coalition of three investment groups would act as a 
stalking horse bidder for the sale of closing stores.136  The coalition proposed 
to pay 73% of cost value of all merchandise at the store plus 50% of all net 
 
Michigan expert says, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.annarbor.com/business-
review/borders-group-merger-or-bankruptcy-filing-inevitable-expert-says/.   
 131  Debtors’ Omnibus Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and 554(a) and Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 6006, 6007 and 9014 for Approval of Rejection of Certain Unexpired Leases of 
Non-Residential Real Property and Authorization to Abandon Certain Property Effective as 
of the Commencement Date at ¶ 2, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 23.   
 132  Voluntary Petition (Chapter 11) at Ex. A, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 1.   
 133  Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Entry of Order (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Sell 
Certain Assets Through Store Closing Sales and to Enter into Agency Agreement with (A) 
Joint Venture Composed of Hilco Merchant Resources, LLC, SB Capital Group, LLC, and 
Tiger Capital Group, LLC or (B) Other Successful Bidder at the Auction, (II) Approving 
Stalking Horse Fee, (III) Authorizing Debtors to Abandon Unsold Property, (IV) Waiving 
Compliance with Contractual Store Closing Sale Restrictions, (V) Exempting (A) State and 
Local “Fast Pay” Laws and (B) Laws Restricting Store Closing Sales, and (VI) Granting 
Related Relief at 3, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 
2011), ECF No. 7 [hereinafter Emergency Motion]; Declaration of Holly Felder Etlin In 
Support of Store Closing Sale Motion at 3, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614, 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 10.   
 134  Emergency Motion at 2.   
 135  Id.   
 136  A “stalking horse bid” is a term of art in bankruptcy sales.  The bid places a floor on a 
proposed asset sale, setting a minimum opening price for other potentially interested 
purchasers.  For an explanation for why the term is functionally inaccurate from a historical 
perspective, see Stephen Sather, Shakespeare for Lawyers: Stalking Horse, AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., May 1996, at 37 (“As used [in this context], the term ‘stalking horse’ is not an accurate 
metaphor . . . In its original context, a ‘stalking horse’ allowed a hunter to sneak up on its 
quarry.  However, in this usage, the stalking horse does not sneak up on anything; rather, it 
flushes out higher bids.”).   
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proceeds from sales of that merchandise.137 
Another “first day” motion sought to reject unexpired leases associated 
with some of the stores Borders proposed to close.138  The motion identified 
four outstanding leases for stores Borders had already closed.  Borders 
asserted that “marketing the [l]eases for assignment or sublease to a third 
party would not generate any significant value for the estates”; however, 
rejection and abandonment of the leases would save Borders an estimated 
$22.7 million over their remaining terms.139  Borders would later bring 
another similar motion seeking to reject executory contracts. 
Borders also sought court approval of a postpetition financing proposal, 
under which the postpetition lenders would loan $505 million pursuant to a 
“senior secured, superpriority priming loan”—that is, a senior security 
interest in all Borders’ postpetition collateral.140  Prepetition secured lenders 
would receive adequate protection in the form of a junior lien on Borders’ 
collateral, priority of payment as an administrative claim, and a funded 
indemnity reserve up to $500,000.141  As required by statute,142 Borders 
demonstrated that funding was not available any other way; virtually all 
Borders’ assets were subject to prepetition liens, and the lenders Borders had 
approached were unwilling to issue credit as junior or unsecured creditors.143 
These three motions, along with a variety of other motions relating to 
administration of the estate and the continued operation of the company even 
within bankruptcy,144 reflected Borders’ exercise of a debtor’s tools in 
 
 137  Emergency Motion at 3.   
 138  Debtors’ Omnibus Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and 554(a) and Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 6006, 6007 and 9014 for Approval of Rejection of Certain Unexpired Leases of 
Non-Residential Real Property and Authorization to Abandon Certain Property Effective as 
of the Commencement Date at ¶ 7, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 23.   
 139  Id.   
 140  Motion to Authorize Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders Pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. 105, 361, 362, 363, 364 and 507 (1) Approving Postpeition Financing, (2) 
Authorizing Use of Cash Collateral, (3) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority 
Administrative Expense Status, (4) Granting Adequate Protection, (5) Modifying the 
Automatic Stay, and (6) Scheduling a Final Hearing, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-
10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 27.   
 141  Prepetition debt was tentatively calculated in Borders’ Motion as “not less than 
$196,050,000 and $33,699,708 of issued and outstanding letters of credit.”  Id. 
 142  See discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text.   
 143  Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105, 361, 
362, 363, 364 and 507 (1) Approving Postpetition Financing, (2) Authorizing Use of Cash 
Collateral, (3) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Administrative Expense Status, (4) 
Granting Adequate Protection, (5) Modifying the Automatic Stay, and (6) Scheduling a Final 
Hearing at 24–25, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 
2011), ECF No. 27.   
 144  For example, Debtors’ motions to implement certain notice and case management 
procedures, for authorization to pay employee obligations and continue employee benefit 
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bankruptcy.  With the automatic stay protecting Borders from creditors’ 
collection efforts, Borders began efforts to cut ties with old debts and slim 
down outstanding obligations, as well as secure future financing, all with 
greater ease and less cost than could be obtained outside of bankruptcy.145  
As described by Borders’ CFO, Scott Henry, Borders commenced the 
chapter 11 case 
to pursue an operational and financial restructuring, to restore and 
revitalize Borders as the second largest chain of bookstores in the 
nation, and to save thousands of jobs.  Among other things, we 
hope, through the approval of certain First Day Motions, to regain 
access to capital that Borders sorely needs to remain viable, and 
to shed approximately 200 stores that we cannot afford to keep.146 
The court supported these goals: Borders’ motion for approval of 
postpetition financing was granted on an interim basis the next day.147  The 
motion to sell the assets of the closing stores pursuant to auction was granted 
the day after.148  The motion to reject unexpired leases took slightly longer, 
but was also granted less than three weeks later.149 
At the same time that Borders attempted to reorganize the company it 
 
programs, and for continuation of deadlines to file schedules of assets and liabilities.  See 
generally In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF 
Nos. 11, 12, and 14.   
 145  As explained above, supra notes 76–92 and accompanying text, asset sales conducted 
with the oversight of the court permits the debtor greater control over the outcome of the sale, 
while the rejection of unexpired leases in bankruptcy permits any default of the debtor to be 
paid in “bankruptcy dollars,” that is, whatever pro rata percentage the debtor ultimately pays 
to unsecured creditors.  Finally, the bankruptcy court can force previously senior secured 
creditors to accept a downgrade in priority to make way for new estate financiers, a move that 
could not be accomplished outside of bankruptcy without their consent.   
 146  Declaration of Scott Henry Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2 in Support of 
First Day Motions at 2, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
16, 2011), ECF No. 20.   
 147  Interim Order Granting Motion (1) Approving Postpetition Financing, (2) Authorizing 
Use of Cash Collateral, (3) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Administrative 
Expense Status, (4) Granting Adequate Protection, (5) Modifying the Automatic Stay, and (6) 
Scheduling a Final Hearing at 19, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011), ECF Nos. 69, 2462. The final order, after the court heard objections, 
was entered about a month later.  See Final Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 
363, 364 and 507 (1) Approving Postpetition Financing, (2) Authorizing Use of Cash 
Collateral, (3) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Administration Expense Status, 
(4) Granting Adequate Protection, and (5) Modifying Automatic Stay, In re Borders Grp., 
Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011), ECF No. 404.   
 148  Order Approving Agency Agreement, Store Closing Sales and Related Relief at 6, No. 
1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2011), ECF No. 91.   
 149  Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), and 554(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6006, 6007 
and 9014 Approving the Rejection of Certain Unexpired Leases of Non-Residential Real 
Property and Authorizing the Abandonment of Certain Personal Property Effective as of the 
Commencement Date at 2, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 4, 2011), ECF No. 258.   
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also began considering a sale of the business as a going concern, pursuant to 
the demands of unsecured creditors.150  On June 30th, a little over four 
months into the bankruptcy, Borders filed a motion seeking approval of the 
sale of substantially all assets free and clear of all liens to a pre-specified 
stalking horse bidder, Najafi Companies, for $215 million.151  Multiple 
creditors filed objections, most notably, the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors (OCC).152  The OCC indicated that, although it would 
not object to the sale of substantially all of Borders’ assets through a going 
concern sale, the proposed agreement permitted the buyer to liquidate the 
assets immediately upon sale, such that the arrangement “neither maximizes 
value for the benefit of unsecured creditors nor provides for the other benefits 
of a going concern—preservation of the business and the thousands of jobs 
that go along with that business.”153  In other words, the buyer in the sale 
would take advantage of whatever value was contained in the raw assets of 
the company.  The buyer was not buying Borders as a continuing entity, only 
the company’s physical assets. 
The court agreed with the OCC, and following a court-supervised 
auction with no bidders, Borders was sold to the stalking horse buyer 
preferred by the OCC, one who specialized in the winding down and 
piecemeal sale of companies.154  As of July 21, Borders’ reorganization had 
officially become a liquidation. 
4. Going Concern Value 
Although the original intent was to restructure the company by closing 
 
 150  See Notice of Hearing on Debtors’ Motion for an Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 363 
and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules 2002, 6004, 6006 and 9014 of the Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure (I) Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets 
Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims, Encumbrances and Interests and the Assumption and 
Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases Related Thereto, (II) Approving 
the Sale Procedures and Break-Up Fee, and (III) Granting Related Relief, In re Borders Grp., 
Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2011), ECF No. 1130.   
 151  Id.; Michael J. De La Merced, Borders Faces Liquidation After Takeover Bid’s 
Rejection, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/borders-
faces-liquidation-after-takeover-bids-rejectionthe-borders-group-was-dealt-a-potentially-leth
al-blow-on-wednesday-when-a-committee-of-its-unsecured-creditors-rejected-a-proposed-ta
keover-by/?ref=business&_r=0.   
 152  Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Bid Procedures and 
Break-Up Fee Contained in the Debtors’ Motion for an Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 363 
and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules 2002, 6004, 6006 and 9014 of the Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure (I) Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets 
Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims, Encumbrances and Interests and the Assumption and 
Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases Related Thereto, (II) Approving 
the Sale Procedures and Break-Up Fee, and (III) Granting Related Relief at 3, In re Borders 
Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2011), ECF No. 1216.   
 153  Id.   
 154  De La Merced, supra note 151.   
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unprofitable stores and transitioning to a focus on electronic offerings, it 
soon became apparent that the contribution of the company was the provision 
of services that proved to be totally obsolete, easily replicated by others, and 
available at a lower cost than Borders could provide.  The market in which 
Borders had sought to compete changed dramatically over the course of its 
existence, and the company simply failed to adjust to the change.  Its 
downfall was compared by analysts to the death of the dinosaurs, “swept up 
in forces they were not prepared for and did nothing to prevent.”155 
Borders’ enormous storefronts, stocked with literature that was difficult 
to find, could not compete with the ease of online purchases, or the 
accessibility of text through electronic devices.  What is more, the stores 
were staggeringly more expensive to maintain.  Borders’ failure to invest in 
electronic technologies, notably the online sales of books and the provision 
of electronic books, completely undermined its ability to compete in the age 
of the internet.156  Whatever value Borders could provide as a going concern 
was eroded over time, such that, by the point it filed for bankruptcy, there 
was no real value to exploit apart from the simple liquidation of its assets.  
In other words, the cost to bring an outdated behemoth such as Borders into 
the 21st century was too much to justify preservation of the Borders name.157 
B. Blockbuster: From Renting VHS to Digital Streaming 
Blockbuster’s history suggests a watershed moment, when the 
company could have and should have altered its business model in such a 
way to embrace the transition of the movie rental business from a strictly 
hard-copy, in-store model to one that would allow for mailing and streaming 
media over the internet.  Unfortunately for Blockbuster, other forces 
prevailed.  A shareholder proxy fight was waged over the issue of what 
direction the company would take, and this resulted in a decision to retrench 
in established business practices rather than adjust to a changing market.  
Early abandonment of new technologies would later prove disastrous for the 
company’s long-term prospects. 
1. Beginnings 
Blockbuster Video was opened in 1985 by husband and wife team 
 
 155  CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 51.   
 156  See Ben Austen, The End of Borders and the Future of Books, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 10, 2011, 8:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-
11-10/the-end-of-borders-and-the-future-of-books.   
 157  Borders’ failure did open space for the revival of many smaller independent bookstore 
owners, who were able to capitalize on the market for physical storefronts while 
simultaneously integrating the demand for e-books.  See Austen, supra note 156 (quoting the 
owner of Parnassus, an independent bookstore, as saying, “We’re building our store from the 
bones of the superstores.”).   
GOTBERG (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2017  10:54 AM 
146 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:111 
David and Sandy Cook, leasing movies on videotapes to individuals that they 
could watch on their personal videocassette recorders (VCRs).158  At the 
time, VCRs were widely owned, and increasingly available to average 
households.159  Most people rented movies from small local video rental 
stores, and doing so was the only real alternative to going to a movie theater.  
Blockbuster’s initial strength was in its inventory of cassettes, which 
dramatically exceeded those of contemporary competitors, and in its use of 
barcodes, magnetic strips, and computers to keep track of inventory, 
discourage theft, and facilitate checkout.160  The variety of selection 
Blockbuster was able to offer quickly translated into significant profits and 
growth.  Early expansion meant that Blockbuster had nearly 400 stores by 
1988, only three years after its formation.161 
Before Blockbuster’s tenth anniversary, the chain would have more 
than 3,400 stores, and had begun to partner with movie studios in promoting 
and advertising particular films.162  In 1994, Blockbuster merged with 
Viacom and began experimenting with sales of other products, such as 
snacks, t-shirts, magazines, CDs, and toys.163  Competition from other big 
names such as Hollywood Video and even Wal-Mart restricted overall 
profits, and in 1996, Blockbuster experienced a new challenge—a change in 
format from cassettes to DVDs.  For Blockbuster, this required a wholesale 
turnover in inventory to reflect the new format.  It also meant the emergence 
of a new competitor, which quickly capitalized on the technological advance. 
2. Fallout of Technological Innovation 
Netflix, Inc., one of the pioneers of the new DVD market, was formed 
in 1997 with the business model of subscribing customers to rent DVDs by 
mail.164  The slim and durable design of the DVDs, especially as compared 
to the bulky VHS cassettes, made this proposal economically feasible, as the 
DVDs could be more safely and inexpensively delivered and returned.  
Although initially the market for DVD rentals was small, limited to those 
who could afford the more expensive DVD players, by 2003, Netflix had 
 
 158  CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 154.   
 159  In 1985 an estimated 11.5 million VCRs were sold in America, with prices from $200 
to $400.  See Johnnie L. Roberts, The Vcr Boom: Prices Drop As Their Popularity Continues 
To Grow, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 1985), reprinted in http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-
09-22/news/8503040687_1_vcr-boom-suppliers-marketers.   
 160  CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 108, at 154.   
 161  Id. at 154.   
 162  Id. at 155.  
 163  Id.  
 164  Jeffrey M. O’Brien, The Netflix Effect, WIRED (Dec. 1, 2002, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2002/12/netflix-6/.   
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acquired more than one million subscribers.165  Netflix had already acquired 
revenue sharing agreements with movie producers that permitted it to 
purchase DVDs at a reduced rate in exchange for a cut of rental receipts, and 
had begun to acquire large numbers of independent and hard-to-find videos 
that would not be available at most video stores.166 
From the consumer perspective, Netflix eliminated the need to travel to 
a storefront to get a desired DVD, which could be ordered online in 
advance.167  In addition, Netflix, pursuant to its subscription model, 
permitted customers to keep a DVD as long as desired, with the caveat that 
no further DVDs would be issued before it was returned.168  Netflix also 
incorporated technology known as CineMatch, which allowed subscribers to 
rate the movies they viewed and receive recommendations of movie titles 
similar to those they liked.169  The ability to easily request additional, similar 
titles expanded customers’ tastes beyond what was immediately popular, at 
a cost-savings to Netflix, as box office hits typically require larger revenue-
sharing than other movies.170 
Recognizing the competitive threat from Netflix, Blockbuster moved to 
adopt several of the Netflix innovations in 2004.171  However, it continued 
to see a slide in rentals as more people became Netflix subscribers and/or 
began purchasing their own collection of DVDs from Amazon or Wal-
Mart.172  In spite of these numbers, CEO John Antioco was optimistic about 
Blockbuster’s future, proposing to spend $200 million to launch Blockbuster 
Online, an online DVD subscription.173  He also eliminated late fees for in-
store rentals, a popular move among customers, but at the cost of another 
$200 million to the company.174  These expenditures were controversial 
among Blockbuster shareholders and sparked a proxy fight.175  Investor Carl 
Icahn launched the challenge in 2005, and was able to successfully bring 
himself onto the board of directors.176  After the board clashed with Antioco 
 
 165  CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 155.   
 166 Id.  
 167  O’Brien, supra note 160.   
 168 Id.   
 169 Id.   
 170 Id.   
 171  Stephen Gandel, How Blockbuster Failed at Failing, TIME (Oct. 17, 2010) 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2022624,00.html.   
 172  John Antioco, How I Did It: Blockbuster’s Former CEO on Sparring with an Activist 
Shareholder, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2011) https://hbr.org/2011/04/how-i-did-it-bloc
kbusters-former-ceo-on-sparring-with-an-activist-shareholder#comment-167712680; 
CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 155.   
 173  Antioco, supra note 172.   
 174  Id.   
 175  Id.   
 176  Id.   
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over salary, he stepped down as CEO in 2007.177  At roughly the same time, 
Blockbuster collided with yet another form of technologically innovative 
competition. 
Redbox Automated Retail, LLC began placing DVD rental kiosks in 
2002, and by 2007 had more than 6,000 kiosks in restaurants, grocery stores, 
and shopping malls around the country.178  These kiosks permitted customers 
to reserve DVDs online and then pick them up at the kiosk, renting them by 
the day, with the ability to return the DVD at any convenient time.179  
Customers could also peruse availability at the kiosk, which compared in 
expense to a Blockbuster store the way a vending machine might compare to 
a grocery store, with no full-time employees and minimal expenses for leases 
or utilities.  What Redbox lacked in variety it compensated for in ease and 
convenience, and it quickly became one of the largest rental services in the 
nation.180 
Unable to keep up with these developments, an early competitor of 
Blockbuster and another store-based rental model, Hollywood Video, filed 
for bankruptcy in 2007.181  Blockbuster’s response, under new CEO Jim 
Keyes, was to shift focus back to its in-store business, raising prices for 
online rentals and losing scores of customers as a result.182  In early 2009, 
Blockbuster launched its own line of vending kiosks, building a base of over 
6,000 kiosks by 2010.183  It also augmented its by-mail subscription program 
by permitting customers to exchange online movie rentals for in-store 
movies.184 
But Blockbuster continued to lose market share to its competitors.  In 
2008, Netflix began to offer movie streaming services to subscribers, who 
could stream movies directly from the internet.185  At this time, Netflix was 
generating $115 million in profit, while Blockbuster was recording losses of 
$517 million.186  In 2009, Blockbuster closed nearly 1,000 of its stores 
(which by then numbered more than 7,000) and took other steps to reduce 
 
 177  Id.   
 178  CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 156.   
 179  Kim Iskyan, Here’s a look back at one of Carl Icahn’s gigantic mistakes, BUS. INSIDER 
(May 3, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/carl-icahns-blockbuster-mistake-2016-5.   
 180  CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 156.   
 181  Associated Press, Hollywood Video owner files for bankruptcy, NBCNEWS (Feb. 3, 
2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35222092/ns/business-us_business/t/hollywood-video-
owner-files-bankruptcy/#.WKcmpPkrKM8.   
 182  Antioco, supra note 172.   
 183  Todd Davis & John Higgins, A Blockbuster Failure: How an Outdated Business Model 
Destroyed a Giant, CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY CASE STUDIES 160 (2013) at 5, 
http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_studlawbankruptcy/11.   
 184  Id.   
 185  CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 156.   
 186  Id.   
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general and administrative expenses, in addition to refinancing transactions 
and freeing up cash.187  These steps proved inadequate to curb financial 
problems.  Blockbuster began to struggle with illiquidity, and share prices 
for Blockbuster stock dropped until July 7, 2010, when Blockbuster was 
delisted from the New York Stock Exchange.188  Blockbuster filed for 
chapter 11 on September 23, 2010, only a few months after Hollywood 
Video initiated liquidation proceedings.189 
3. Bankruptcy 
Blockbuster Inc. filed its chapter 11 petition joined by a dozen sister 
corporations, including Blockbuster Canada, Blockbuster International 
Spain, and Blockbuster Video Italy.190  Blockbuster’s listed assets topped $1 
billion, but its liabilities exceeded $1.5 billion.191  Blockbuster’s petition 
listed unsecured claims topped by over $300 million in bond debt, followed 
by a series of smaller trade debts to various studios, ranging from $21 million 
to just over $162 thousand.192  Secured debt, to the tune of about $630 
million,193 was in the form of Senior Secured Notes, with an interest in “all 
assets of the debtors.”194 
The petition included an affidavit from newly-appointed Chief 
Restructuring Officer Jeffery J. Stegenga, who blamed Blockbuster’s 
financial challenges on the general economic recession and the rise of 
competitive alternatives to Blockbuster’s products, along with 
“unsustainable levels of debt.”195  Stegenga later described in detail how 
“technological advances” along with “changing consumer preferences” and 
 
 187  Id.; Davis & Higgins, supra note 183.   
 188  Affidavit of Jeffery J. Stegenga Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2 in Support 
of First Day Motions at 13, In re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 10-14997-cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 23, 2010), ECF No. 3. [hereinafter Stegenga Affidavit].   
 189  Voluntary Petition (Chapter 11), In re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 10-14997-cgm (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010), ECF No. 1.  Roughly 40% of Blockbuster stores were outside the 
United States at the time of filing.   
 190  Id.  Stegenga Affidavit, supra note 188, at 51.   
 191  Id.   
 192  Stegenga Affidavit, supra note 188, at 55.   
 193  Different filings differ on the precise number.  See Stegenga Affidavit, supra note 188, 
at 14; Voluntary Petition, supra note 189, at 6.; Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order, on an 
interim and Final Basis, (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Superpriority 
Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 364(c), 364(d)(1), and 364(e), (II) 
Authorizing Debtors’ Use of Cash Collateral Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, (III) Granting Liens 
and Superpriority Claims to DIP Lenders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 364, (IV) Providing 
Adequate Protection Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363 and 364, and (V) Scheduling a 
Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 4001(b), 4001(c) and 6004, In re BB 
Liquidating Inc., No. 10-14997-cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010), ECF No. 16 
[hereinafter Motion for Entry of an Order].   
 194  Stegenga Affidavit, supra note 188, at 63.   
 195  Id. at 15.   
GOTBERG (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2017  10:54 AM 
150 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:111 
“the rapid growth of disruptive new competitors” had “changed the 
landscape of the industry.”196  Demonstrating significant self-awareness, he 
further noted that competitors, using alternative distribution methods, had 
garnered market share and eroded Blockbuster’s “traditional ‘brick and 
mortar’ retail store based customer market.”197  He observed, “[w]hile 
Blockbuster has successfully launched its own channels of distribution in the 
by-mail and . . . vending kiosk markets, the revenues and profits from these 
new channels have not offset the negative economic results from the reduced 
traffic within, and downsizing of, its traditional store-based channel.”198 
In the same document, Stegenga put forth a set of restructuring goals, 
indicating that Blockbuster had already begun to document a recapitalization 
transaction structure, arranged for DIP financing, and established contractual 
terms with movie studios going forward.199  Through pre-bankruptcy 
negotiations, Blockbuster entered chapter 11 with a “Plan Support 
Agreement,” which had the support of 80% of secured creditors.200  The plan 
would convert debt into equity and provide Blockbuster with fresh capital 
“to effect a restructuring that will maximize value and assure Blockbuster’s 
long-term viability.”201 
With these goals in mind, Blockbuster raised first day motions seeking, 
among other things, authorization to grant postpetition financing by 
superpriority priming202 old secured debt to the amount of $125 million.203  
A motion to reject unexpired leases followed the next day.204  The debtor’s 
motion for postpetition financing was granted (albeit on an interim basis) 
almost immediately.205  An order on the debtor’s motion regarding the 
rejection of unexpired leases was delayed subject to an objection, but 
 
 196  Id. at 16.   
 197  Id.   
 198  Id.   
 199  Id. at 24-25.   
 200  Stegenga Affidavit, supra note 188, at 25.   
 201  Id.   
 202  See supra note 92.   
 203  Motion for Entry of an Order, supra note 193, at 3.   
 204  Motion to Approve / Debtor’s Omnibus Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and 
554(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6006, 6007, and 9014 for Approval of Rejection of Certain 
Unexpired Leases of Non-Residential Real Property and Authorization to Abandon Certain 
Property Effective as of the Commencement Date, In re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 10-14997-
cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2010), ECF No. 73 [hereinafter Omnibus Motion].   
 205  Bridge Order (I) Authorizing Postpetition Superpriority Secured Financing Pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 361, 362, 364(c)(2), 364(c)(30, 364(d)(1) and 364(e), (II) Authorizing 
Postpetition Use of Cash Collateral Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §363, (III) Granting Adequate 
Protection Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363 and 364 and (IV) Scheduling a Final 
Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(b) and 4001(c), In re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 
1:10-bk-14997-cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010), ECF No. 74 [hereinafter Bridge 
Order].   
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approval was granted roughly four weeks later.206 
Given that Blockbuster had the pre-negotiated agreement with senior 
lenders and the support of the bankruptcy court in its proposed use of 
bankruptcy tools, it was not unreasonable to expect a successful 
reorganization.207  However, the bankruptcy quickly stalled, as business 
continued to decline and the debtor was unable to reach an agreement with 
its post-petition financiers.208  After being granted two extensions of time to 
file a plan, Blockbuster ultimately requested, and was granted, the ability to 
sell substantially all of its assets to Dish Network Corporation pursuant to 
Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.209  The sale transferred all stores and 
operations to the buyer, leaving Blockbuster an empty shell “with no ongoing 
operations and only one remaining employee.”210  Blockbuster changed its 
name to BB Liquidating Inc. and converted its chapter 11 reorganization to 
a chapter 7 liquidation.211 
4. Going Concern Value 
Dish Network invested roughly $320 million in its purchase of 
Blockbuster’s assets and its brand.212  Dish then quickly used the Blockbuster 
streaming service to boost its own satellite TV plans and attempt to compete 
with Netflix streaming services.213  However, Blockbuster’s strength was 
still in its hard-copy (rather than digital) library, with more than 100,000 
available titles on DVD compared with 3,000 to 4,000 available to stream.214  
 
 206  Order Establishing and Authorizing Procedures for the Rejection of Unexpired Leases 
of Nonresidential Real Property, In re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 1:10-bk-14997 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2010) ECF No. 362.   
 207  Blockbuster indeed had every expectation of a quick plan confirmation.  See Notice of 
Hearing Regarding Debtor’s Motion, Pursuant to Section 1112(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 
and Bankruptcy Rules 1017(f) and 1019, to Convert their Chapter 11 Cases to Cases under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code at 3, In re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 1:10-bk-14997 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2013), ECF No. 2856 [hereinafter Notice of Hearing].   
 208  Id.   
 209  See Debtors’ Emergency Motion, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 and Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 2002, 4001, 6004, and 9014, for Entry of a Supplemental Order Approving 
Amended and Restated Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement By and Among Blockbuster, Inc., 
the Debtor Subsidiaries Party Thereto, and Dish Network Corporation, In re BB Liquidating 
Inc., No. 1:10-bk-14997 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2011) ECF No. 1692; Supplemental 
Order, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 4001, 6004, and 
9014, Approving Amended and Restated Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement By and Among 
Blockbuster, Inc., The Debtor Subsidiaries Party Thereto, and Dish Network Corporation, In 
re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 1:10-bk-14997 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2011) ECF No. 1723.   
 210  Id.   
 211  Notice of Hearing, supra note 207.   
 212 Ryan Lawler, So Why Did Dish Really Buy Blockbuster?, GIGAOM (Apr. 6, 2011, 6:33 
AM) https://gigaom.com/2011/04/06/dish-blockbuster-acquisition/.   
 213  Id.   
 214  See Matt Burns, Blockbuster Movie Pass: Dish Network’s $10/Month Answer to 
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Customers did not latch on to the advertised ability to return videos in-store 
the way that promoters had hoped, and within two years of its purchase, after 
gradually shutting lower-performing stores, Dish Network announced that it 
would close all remaining Blockbuster Video retail locations, laying off 
nearly 3,000 employees.215 
Former investor Icahn, who initially resisted Antioco’s shift toward 
more digital offerings, is reported to have lost nearly $200 million in the 
company.216  In the Harvard Business Review, he described Blockbuster as 
“the ‘worst investment’ he ever made.”217  He went on to say, “It failed 
because of too much debt and changes in the industry.  It had too many stores, 
Netflix created a better business model, and then Redbox kiosks and the 
whole digital phenomenon eliminated the need for consumers to go to a 
separate DVD store.”218  In his statement, Icahn does not acknowledge that, 
as winner of the proxy fight, he was ideally situated to prevent Blockbuster’s 
disastrous loss of value due to declining assets in a time of changing 
technology. 
C. Kodak: Protecting Old Investments By Abandoning New Ideas 
1. Beginnings 
The Eastman Kodak Company was founded in 1888, and over the 
course of a century became a household name and an industry giant.219  
Known for its pioneering technology and innovative marketing,220 Kodak 
created and sold inexpensive household cameras, along with the film, 
chemicals, and paper required to develop photographs.221  It developed a 
successful marketing campaign encouraging individuals to capture that 
“Kodak Moment” by preserving images of daily life on film.222  The term 
 
Netflix, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 23, 2011) https://techcrunch.com/2011/09/23/blockbuster-
movie-pass-dish-networks-answer-to-netflix-and-qwikster/.   
 215  Liana B. Baker, Dish Network to close all Blockbuster stores, lay off 2,800, REUTERS 
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-blockbuster-dish-idUSBRE9A511Z
20131106.   
 216  Kim Iskyan, Here’s a look back at one of Carl Icahn’s gigantic mistakes, BUS. INSIDER 
(May 3, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/carl-icahns-blockbuster-mistake-2016-5.   
 217  Jeanine Poggi, Icahn: Blockbuster ‘Worst Investment’ I Ever Made, THESTREET (Mar. 
21, 2011), https://www.thestreet.com/story/11053480/1/icahn-blockbuster-worst-investment
-i-ever-made.html.   
 218  Id.   
 219  The last Kodak moment?, ECONOMIST (Jan. 14, 2012), http://www.economist.com/
node/21542796.   
 220  Id.   
 221  Id.   
 222 See Deborah L. Jacobs, What Will Become of The ‘Kodak Moment’?, FORBES (Jan. 19, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2012/01/19/what-will-become-of-the-
kodak-moment/#44c4fb295c29.   
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eventually became part of the popular lexicon, meaning “[a] sentimental or 
charming moment worthy of capturing in a photograph.”223  Following the 
company’s spectacular demise, the slang came to also mean “[t]he situation 
in which a business fails to foresee changes within its industry and drops 
from a market-dominant position to being a minor player or declares 
bankruptcy.”224 
In 1976, Kodak accounted for 90% of film sales and 85% of camera 
sales in America, and was regularly rated one of the world’s five most 
valuable brands.225  One year earlier, in 1975, the company had built one of 
the first digital cameras.226  Rather than fully develop the technology, Kodak 
dropped it, reportedly out of fear that it would threaten the photographic film 
business it had built up.227  Within a few years, Kodak became distracted by 
challenges from Fujifilm, a Japanese competitor, and competition with Fuji’s 
lower-priced alternative came to dominate its market outlook.228  Kodak’s 
frustration with cheap Japanese film even led to trade friction between 
America and Japan during the 1990s, to the point that the United States 
issued a complaint against Japan to the World Trade Organization, without 
success.229 
2. Fallout of Technological Innovation 
When digital products began to gain traction in the market in the mid-
1980s, Kodak integrated digital features into its product lines.230  This 
approach seemed to serve it well, and in 1996, revenues peaked at nearly $16 
billion.231  Kodak profits peaked a few years later, reaching $2.5 billion in 
1999.232  Throughout this time period, however, consumers began to switch 
in ever-growing numbers to digital cameras, even in third-world countries.233  
In middle-class China, for example, many consumers purchased digital 
cameras first, skipping the older film models entirely.234  Kodak continued 
to participate in the digital market, and by 2001, it was the second largest 
 
 223 Kodak moment, WIKITIONARY (July 27, 2016), https://en.wiktionary.org/
wiki/Kodak_moment.   
 224 Id.   
 225 See The last Kodak moment?, supra note 219.   
 226  Id. 
 227  Id.   
 228  See Michael Hiltzik, Kodak’s Long Fade to Black, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/04/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20111204.   
 229  See The last Kodak moment, supra note 219.   
 230  See Hiltzik, supra note 228.   
 231  See The last Kodak moment, supra note 219.   
 232  Id.   
 233  See id. 
 234 This was unfortunate for Kodak, which had been relying on China as an emerging 
market.  See LUCAS, JR., supra note 2, at 16.   
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seller of digital cameras.235 
However, Kodak had already begun to lose money on the digital camera 
model, which did not require the additional film, chemical, and paper 
products their older cameras had.  Beginning around 2001, film sales began 
to fall 20-30% per year.236  Many photos taken during that time period were 
never developed, but rather were saved in digital form on computers or other 
devices.  As people began to take more and more pictures using cell phones 
and other devices rather than digital cameras, Kodak’s share of the market 
shrunk even more.237  Although Kodak developed and then humored the 
digital camera, it did not envision or anticipate that digital cameras would 
entirely replace what had been, up to then, Kodak’s “razor and blades” 
(camera and film) approach to picture taking.238 
Many within Kodak pushed for greater recognition of the digital market 
early on.  Larry Matteson, a former Kodak executive, wrote a report in 1979 
detailing the ways in which the market would switch from film to digital—
beginning with the government, then professional photography, and then the 
market at large, by 2010.239  But the profit on digital cameras paled in 
comparison to the profit on film.  Matteson reported that: “Wise 
businesspeople concluded that it was best not to hurry to switch from making 
70 cents on the dollar on film to maybe five cents at most in digital.”240  
Although it was true that Kodak could make substantially more in the short-
term under the old model, failure to adjust to the new technology spelled 
disaster in the long run.241 
By 2003, only a few years out from Kodak’s peak performance, the 
company announced that it would halt investing in traditional film in light of 
plummeting demand.242  Instead, under the leadership of CEO Antonio M. 
Perez, Kodak began investing in inkjet printers and patent lawsuits, drawing 
on its formidable library to target companies like LG and Sony, among 
others.243  The company reduced its workforce by approximately 75% from 
 
 235  See Hiltzik, supra note 228.   
 236  Quentin Hardy, At Kodak, Clinging to a Future Beyond Film, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/business/at-kodak-clinging-to-a-future-beyond
-film.html.  
 237  See Hiltzik, supra note 228.   
 238  Id.   
 239  See The last Kodak moment?, supra note 219.   
 240  Id.   
 241  See LUCAS, JR., supra note 2, at 24.(quoting Carly Fiorina’s observation that Kodak 
“protected its franchise for as long as it could” and only entered digital photography “when it 
was completely obvious to everyone that the old model simply would not survive”).   
 242  De La Merced, supra note 151.   
 243  Id.; Marius Meland, Kodak Sues Sony Over Digital Camera Patents, LAW360 (Mar. 
10, 2004), https://www.law360.com/articles/1094/kodak-sues-sony-over-digital-camera-
patents.  These lawsuits were responsible for billions of dollars of revenue in the years leading 
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2003 to 2011.244  Revenue did not meet expectations, however,245 and in a 
last-ditch effort to avoid bankruptcy, Kodak announced the sale of its digital 
imaging patents in 2011, suggesting the company intended to abandon the 
digital photography market altogether.246  In the absence of sufficiently 
interested buyers, Kodak filed for bankruptcy protection on January 19, 
2012.247 
3. Bankruptcy 
Kodak listed $5.1 billion in total assets and $6.75 billion in debts on its 
chapter 11 bankruptcy filing.248  In its preliminary statement accompanying 
the filing, Kodak blamed its liquidity issues on difficulties in collecting 
licensing fees from infringers of its intellectual property, as well as 
substantial legacy costs, particularly costs associated with post-employment 
benefits for thousands of retired Kodak employees. 249  It indicated that its 
primary motivation in filing for bankruptcy protection was to obtain 
postpetition DIP finance,250 and consistent with this desire, filed a motion 
pursuant to Section 364 to borrow $950 million secured by estate property.251  
Kodak proposed to offer DIP lenders the highest protection possible: 
superpriority, priming liens, and the ability to “roll-up” prepetition lien 
debt.252  The same day, Kodak also filed motions to reject unexpired aircraft 
 
up to bankruptcy.  See Affidavit—Declaration of Antoinette P. McCorvey at 3, In re Eastman 
Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter 
McCorvey Affidavit].   
 244  Kodak went from having approximately 63,900 employees in 2003 to roughly 17,000 
employees by the time of its bankruptcy filing in 2011.  See McCorvey Affidavit, supra note 
243, at 3.   
 245  This was in part due to flawed estimates in the market for film.  As acknowledged by 
Kodak, the company had anticipated a 20% decline in film sales between 2008 and 2010, 
which was roughly half of the actual decline.  See McCorvey Affidavit, supra note 243, at 14.   
 246  De La Merced, supra note 151.   
 247  In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), 
ECF No. 1.   
 248  Id.   
 249  See McCorvey Affidavit, supra note 243, at 13.  Kodak listed the Kodak Pension Plan 
of the United Kingdom as its largest unsecured creditor, with a claim that was as-yet 
undetermined.  Statement—Notice of Filing of Amended Consolidated List of Creditors 
Holding 50 Largest Unsecured Claims at 4, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 80.   
 250  See McCorvey Affidavit, supra note 243, at 5.   
 251  Motion to Approve Debtor in Possession Financing at 3–4, In re Eastman Kodak Co., 
No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 16.   
 252  Id. at 5–6, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 
2012), ECF No. 16.  A “roll-up” permits a post-petition lender to shift its pre-petition 
unsecured debt into post-petition administrative debt, thereby making repayment significantly 
more likely.   
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leases253 and nonresidential real property leases,254 as well as various 
executory contracts.255 
Kodak’s bankruptcy motions were resisted by creditors who accused 
them of “burning the furniture”—selling off valuable assets in one-time cash 
generation events—and were skeptical of Kodak’s ability to effectively 
reorganize.256  Indeed, there was little doubt that Kodak was engaging in 
dramatic downsizing as part of its process of reorganization.  Kodak made 
multiple motions to sell off assets in bankruptcy,257 including its impressive 
Digital Imaging Patent Portfolio.258  This was a particularly noteworthy step; 
Kodak’s patents were seen by many as the most valuable and distinctive 
assets owned by the company.  They were eventually sold to long-time 
competitor Fujifilm, as part of a syndicate of buyers.259 
 
 
 
 
 253  Debtors’ Motion for an Order Authorizing Rejection of Certain Unexpired Aircraft 
Leases Effective as of the Petition Date, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 27. 
 254  Motion to Reject Lease or Executory Contract—Motion for an Order Authorizing 
Rejection of Certain Unexpired Nonresidential Real Property Leases, In re Eastman Kodak 
Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 31.  
 255  Motion to Reject Lease or Executory Contract—First Omnibus Motion for an Order 
Authorizing Rejection of Various Executory Contracts, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-
bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2012), ECF No. 449.   
 256  See Objection/Omnibus Objection of Ad Hoc Committee of Second Lien Noteholders 
to Debtors’ First Day Relief and Statement Regarding the Debtors’ DIP Financing Motion at 
2, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 
39.   
 257  See Motion to Authorize—Motion for Order (i)(A) Authorizing Certain Debtors Entry 
into the Stalking Horse Purchase Agreement, (B) Authorizing and Approving the Bidding 
Procedures and Break-Up Fee, (C) Approving the Notice Procedures, (D) Authorizing the 
Filing of Certain Documents Under Seal and Setting a Date for the Sale Hearing and (II) 
Authorizing and Approving the Sale of Certain Assets of Kodak Imaging Network Inc. Free 
and Clear of All Claims and Interests, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2012), ECF No. 474; Motion to Approve Expedited Procedures for the Sale, 
Transfer, Donation and/or Abandonment of De Minimis Assets, In re Eastman Kodak Co., 
No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012), ECF No. 173.   
 258  Motion to Authorize—Debtors’ Motion for Orders (I)(A) Conditionally Authorizing 
the Sale of Patent Assets Free and Clear of Claims and Interests, (B) Establishing a 
Competitive Bidding Process and (C) Approving the Notice Procedures and (II) Authorizing 
the Sale of Patent Assets Free and Clear of Claims and Interests, In re Eastman Kodak Co., 
No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2012), ECF No. 1361.   
 259  Order Authorizing the Sale of Patent Assets Free and Clear of Claims and Interests, 
The License of Patents, The Assumption of Patent Cross License Agreements With Fujifilm 
and the Settlement of Claims Related to Certain Patents, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-
bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013), ECF No. 2847.  See also Sarah Mitroff, Kodak 
Sells Digital Camera Patents to Apple, Google, Other Tech Giants, WIRED (Dec. 19, 2012), 
https://www.wired.com/2012/12/kodak-patents/.   
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Despite some creditor reservations and complexities of the case which 
necessitated a motion to extend the time to submit a plan,260 Kodak’s plan 
was ultimately confirmed.  As part of the plan, Kodak settled legacy pension 
claims and made reduced payments to noteholders.  Shareholder claims were 
entirely wiped out.  Although these shareholders voted against the plan, it 
was approved over their objection by virtue of “cramdown” provisions that 
permit a plan that has been accepted by other classes of creditors to proceed, 
if fair and equitable.261  Kodak was officially reorganized, and emerged from 
bankruptcy discharged of debts as provided in the plan, albeit a very different 
creature than it was entering bankruptcy. 
4. Going Concern Value 
Following its massive shed of assets, Kodak has struggled to define 
itself.  As part of its bankruptcy transformation, Kodak fully exited what it 
described as the “low-growth dedicated capture device business,” meaning 
digital cameras, pocket video cameras, and digital picture frames,262 
essentially sacrificing the niche in which it had been known.  No longer 
would customers seek to capture a “Kodak moment,” at least not on a Kodak 
device.  Instead, Kodak proposed to be a leader in inkjet-based digital 
presses, digital printing plates, and other related products.  It remains to be 
seen what value Kodak can contribute in this field.  Its brand, once so 
familiar to consumers, is becoming less and less prominent to consumer 
audiences.  There is a sense that whatever Kodak determines to become, it 
has little time to get there in the face of strong competitive forces,263 and the 
danger of a second bankruptcy filing continues to loom. 
D. Common Themes 
Each of the companies described above were not always technological 
dinosaurs.  To the contrary, they were themselves built, at least initially, on 
technological innovation.  Borders and Blockbuster became industry giants 
using advanced methods and models of inventory tracking, enabling them to 
 
 260  Motion to Extend Exclusivity Period for Filing a Chapter 11 Plan and Disclosure 
Statement and Solicit Acceptances Thereof, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 831 [hereinafter Motion to Extend Exclusivity].   
 261  See Debtors’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Confirmation of First Amended Joint 
Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Eastman Kodak Company and Its Debtor Affiliates, In 
re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013), ECF No. 4863; 
Notice of Filing of Revised Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Confirming the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Eastman Kodak 
Co. and its Debtor Affiliates Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Eastman 
Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013), ECF No. 4897.   
 262  Motion to Extend Exclusivity, supra note 260, at 42.   
 263  See Quentin Hardy, At Kodak, Clinging to a Future Beyond Film, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
20, 2015, at BU1.   
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provide goods more closely tailored to client demand.  Kodak brought the 
product of film and picture-taking to the consumer.  These innovations 
allowed each company to grow exponentially and capitalize on their 
respective markets.  However, each of these companies also failed, in large 
part because they came to rely on their size or became complacent in the 
provision of services that would quickly become obsolete in the face of 
disruptive technologies. 
In the case of Borders and Blockbuster, each company defined itself by 
its ability to provide customers with multiple physical locations containing 
shelves and shelves of product—books, movies, or other media.  When the 
ability to access these forms of media improved, first through online sales, 
which soon were able to beat even the most well-stocked shelves in terms of 
inventory, and then through wholesale digital streaming, which ceased to 
require the purchase of any hard-copy materials, the companies were either 
unable or unwilling to alter their business models in time.  Technological 
disruption proved to be the downfall of each, to the point that not even 
bankruptcy proceedings, with their inherent advantages, were sufficient to 
salvage them.264 
In the case of Kodak, the company had early access to technology that 
would eventually reshape the world of photography and picture-taking.  
However, the company realized that although the technology would improve 
the ability of customers to take photos, it would also make photography 
much less expensive, requiring significantly less of the product that Kodak 
had traditionally marketed.  Rather than accepting a short-term reduction in 
profits, Kodak instead bartered away its future by refusing to change course 
until the money in film had been entirely exhausted, and the alternatives 
uncertain and rife with competition. 
There are generally applicable lessons to be gleaned from these stories.  
The most obvious is the clear need to act promptly when faced with a 
technological disruption.  In each scenario, the companies seemed to realize 
the necessity of responding to technological changes embarrassingly late, 
after new and disruptive innovators had already obtained a strong presence 
in the market.265  In addition, even after recognizing the threat, each company 
seemed to flounder with regard to establishing an effective strategic 
response.  Once it had acknowledged the threat posed by Amazon and 
terminated its agreement with them, Borders initially attempted to respond 
 
 264  See Stephen Gandel, How Blockbuster Failed at Failing, TIME (Oct. 17, 2010), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2022624-2,00.html.   
 265  See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 8 (1997) (comparing 
coping with the onslaught of technological changes to climbing a mudslide raging down a 
hill—”You have to scramble with everything you’ve got to stay on top of it, and if you ever 
once stop to catch your breath, you get buried.”).   
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to the phenomenon of online book purchases by borrowing from a 
sympathetic lender.  It then limped along for three years, accruing debt and 
bleeding cash reserves, before eventually filing for bankruptcy.  Blockbuster 
behaved erratically in response to its technological crisis, initially diving into 
the online market under Antioco’s leadership, but then largely shifting its 
approach back to the old business model under Keyes.  The company did not 
file for bankruptcy until three years after the bankruptcy of its former 
competitor, Hollywood Video.  Kodak deliberately delayed the transition 
into digital photography in a conscious effort to maximize the profit to be 
made from traditional film.  But even after it had concluded that a transition 
was necessary, it attempted to do so outside of bankruptcy for nearly eight 
years, only finally accepting bankruptcy relief when it could not sell its most 
valuable assets. 
It is impossible to say with certainty how circumstances might have 
played out differently had these companies been faster to adjust to 
technology, or even more prompt in taking advantage of bankruptcy 
protection.  Perhaps, if Borders had taken steps to jettison less-profitable 
leases earlier and focused on the stores that maintained their profitability, it 
would have retained its label and maintained an economic presence.  If 
Blockbuster had determined earlier to restructure its business through 
bankruptcy proceedings, there might have been sufficient value in the 
business to avoid a sale to Dish and instead exploit the Blockbuster brand 
through its own online offerings.  Finally, Kodak might have been more able 
to salvage its value through an earlier going concern sale in bankruptcy, as 
opposed to the piecemeal sale of individual assets over the course of several 
years.  This might have preserved the relevance of the term “Kodak moment” 
in the realm of image preservation, rather than a hindsight reference to a poor 
decision. 
A second important lesson is that being large is not necessarily a 
protection against failure, and may in fact be an obstacle in the effort to 
adjust to new technologies.  Although bankruptcy proceedings permit 
companies to reject unprofitable leases and to sell assets in court auctions, 
heavy investments in the wrong sorts of capital are not easily undone.  Large 
debt obligations, such as secured loans or pension plans, may be similarly 
difficult to avoid, with significant consequences for the company and for 
third parties.  The larger the obligations and more complicated the industry, 
the more difficult it may be to make those adjustments in a short period of 
time. 
In retrospect, it seems apparent that each of the three companies 
described above were mismanaged in the years leading up to bankruptcy.  
Management should have made adjustments to the business model earlier, 
observing the changes on the horizon.  It was management’s lack of vision 
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and refusal to pivot that caused the companies to fail.  These examples 
demonstrate that management cannot place their trust in consumer loyalty 
when cheaper, more reliable options for service become available, even 
when the company brand is far-reaching and powerful.  Bankruptcy 
protection cannot encourage the greater use of a debtor’s products or services 
when they become obsolete.  In fact, bankruptcy may actually undermine the 
marketing of products or services by virtue of the stigma associated with a 
bankruptcy filing. 
V.  LAW FIRM BANKRUPTCIES 
This Article argues that law firms are not immune to failure as a 
consequence of technological disruption, and that the experiences of other 
firms that have so failed demonstrate the need for law firms, and the industry 
at large, to respond and adjust quickly to innovation affecting the legal field.  
An obvious response to this cautionary tale, from the perspective of a law 
firm, is that the practice of law is fundamentally different from the provision 
of goods, and law firms are fundamentally different from corporations, with 
different regulatory requirements and capital makeup.  This is all true.  
However, the unique character of a law firm makes the lessons of the 
Blockbuster, Borders, and Kodak bankruptcies described above more 
relevant, not less. 
As demonstrated above, the advancement of technology is certainly 
capable of rendering current models of providing legal services entirely 
obsolete, as tasks traditionally performed by attorneys can be accomplished 
faster and more efficiently by computer software programs.  Law firms, like 
any other business, may quickly find themselves unable to compete with 
alternative providers who have adopted more robust technological methods, 
such that their overhead costs are lower, their provision of services is faster 
and more accurate, or they are otherwise a more desirable choice for clients.  
However, law firms have even greater reason than other businesses to 
respond and readjust to technological advances before bankruptcy becomes 
a necessary reaction, because for law firms, bankruptcy proceedings almost 
inevitably signal total demise, whether the reasons for filing are economic or 
simply financial in nature. 
Law firms find themselves in bankruptcy on a fairly frequent basis, 
similar to firms in any other industry.  However, unlike typical corporate 
bankruptcy cases, these filings are much more likely to be involuntary—filed 
by creditors of the firm rather than the partners themselves266—and 
 
 266  Although this paper has largely addressed the benefits of bankruptcy to the filing 
debtor, they may be benefits to creditors as well, making an involuntary bankruptcy an 
attractive alternative.  For example, creditors may prefer the less rigorous process of filing a 
claim for payment in bankruptcy to obtaining a legal judgment and attempting to enforce it, 
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significantly more likely to end in liquidation of firm assets rather than 
preservation of the company as a going concern.267  This may be explained 
by two attributes shared by virtually all law firms.  First, law firms are 
generally formed as partnerships or, even more commonly, limited liability 
partnerships (LLPs).268  Second, the principal, if not the only significant non-
cash assets of law firms are the personnel—the partners, associates, and 
staff.269  Law firm partners are thus both the assets and the owners of the 
company, and when partners begin to leave, their loss can trigger a partner 
run that quickly bleeds the firm of value and renders it insolvent.270  These 
attributes also have the effect of making a law firm bankruptcy significantly 
more painful for its partners, who lose their jobs in addition to their major 
capital investments. 
Unlike typical partnership agreements, which require dissolution of the 
firm upon the exit of any partner,271 law firms, particularly large law firms, 
permit the entrance and exit of partners without forcing dissolution of the 
firm as a whole, permitting firms to survive beyond the lifetimes of the 
founding individuals.  However, this policy also permits partners to leave 
and join other firms, frequently taking clients, projects, and associates with 
them.  Ethical rules typically prohibit the imposition of non-compete clauses 
or other restrictions on an attorney’s ability to take firm clients.272  
Accordingly, law firms have little ability, other than the powers of 
persuasion, to convince remaining partners to stay with the firm through a 
period of financial distress. 
When a critical number of partners leave a law firm, or when the 
remaining partners lose their faith in the firms’ ability to thrive in the long 
term, there arises a strong incentive for remaining partners to also leave, 
rather than attempt to reorganize or otherwise rehabilitate a firm struggling 
 
recognizing that under state law creditors will be competing amongst themselves in a race to 
the debtor’s assets.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5)(A), 502(a) (defining claims broadly and allowing 
all claims unless a party in interest objects).  In addition, and of particular relevance in the 
context of a law firm debtor, bankruptcy proceedings may permit the recovery of preferential 
payments made while the debtor was insolvent.  See supra note 90.   
 267  Although law firms may file under chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, it is generally 
to confirm a liquidation plan.  See Morley, supra note 11, at 1–2.   
 268  Lawyers are generally prohibited by rules of professional conduct from allowing non-
lawyers to share in legal fees.  This has generally restricted a law firm’s ability to organize as 
a corporation, rather than a partnership.  See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.4: 
Professional Independence of a Lawyer.   
 269  See Jacqueline Palank, Debts of Defunct Law Firms Haunt Partners in Next Job, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 7, 2011 (quoting bankruptcy expert Paul A. Rubin as saying “[t]he most valuable 
assets of a law firm go home every night”).   
 270  See Morley, supra note 11, at 2.   
 271  Id. at 18.   
 272  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6.   
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to maintain its cash flow.273  Particularly when the firm’s profits have fallen 
below what may be offered by competitors, partners are incentivized to 
move, not just for future income but also to protect their capital 
investment.274  The moment a firm becomes insolvent, that investment 
becomes worthless, and in bankruptcy, may actually be a liability, opening 
them up to recovery actions by the bankruptcy estate.275  Once partners begin 
to leave, there is nothing to prevent others from following.  Although 
bankruptcy operates as a stay against the withdrawal of typical “assets” from 
the bankruptcy estate, it cannot force attorneys to stay in the employ of the 
law firm, and in the event of a bankruptcy filing, attorneys almost never 
do.276 
In fact, there is a strong motivation to leave in advance of the firm 
dissolution to avoid being caught in the relevant “clawback” period.  Partners 
whose law firm dissolves frequently find themselves liable for a firm’s 
unpaid debts in bankruptcy court, pursuant to clawback lawsuits,277 by virtue 
 
 273  Red flags of an eventual bankruptcy include the voluntary departure of attorneys.  As 
observed by Al Togut, “[a] trickle can become a flood fairly quickly.  With each departing 
partner, income diminishes and that exacerbates the problem.  A law firm’s principal asset is 
its people who go home each night.  If they go home one night and don’t return in the morning, 
the firm is out of business.”  David J. Parnell, Al Togut of Togut, Segal, On Avoiding Law 
Firm Bankruptcies, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidparnell/2014/
08/04/al-togut-of-togut-segal-on-avoiding-law-firm-bankruptcies/3/#7b7a57f82f91.   
 274  Most law firms tend to require a capital investment from partners, which can be 
substantial.  Rule 5.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires law firms to return 
capital to partners when they leave.   
 275  See Matthew C. Heyn, The Application of Jewel v. Boxer to Law Firm Dissolutions, 
L.A. LAW., Nov. 2014, at 14, https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/
2014-issues/november2014.pdf (“The dissolution of a law firm can be a financial catastrophe 
for its partners.”).  
 276  There is a notable counterexample to this trend, however, in the chapter 11 filing of 
Ruden McClosky, P.A., in 2011.  Ruden filed for chapter 11 after the financial crisis in 2008 
precipitated three-and-a-half years of net losses.  Ruden blamed these losses on both a 
substantial reduction in work and “the departure of many Ruden attorneys, voluntary and 
involuntary, which further reduced Ruden’s income.”  Disclosure Statement in Connection 
with Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation of Ruden McClosky P.A. at 8, In re Ruden 
McClosky P.A., No. 11-bk-40603 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2012), ECF No. 355.  Ruden 
attempted to accomplish a merger or a sale outside of bankruptcy, but was unsuccessful.  As 
revenue continued to decline, Ruden reached an agreement with Greenspoon Marder, P.A., 
pursuant to which Ruden would accomplish a sale of all its assets to Greenspoon through 
bankruptcy proceedings.  Included in the agreement was a provision that permitted remaining 
Ruden employees to join Greenspoon.  Id.  Although Ruden, like other bankrupt law firms, 
was ultimately liquidated and ceased to exist as a going concern, bankruptcy was effective in 
keeping the assets and the personnel of the Ruden firm in the same organization, even if it no 
longer retained the firm name.  By most standards, this would be categorized as a successful 
chapter 11 case.   
 277  In such litigation, a bankruptcy trustee will demand that former partners return all or 
a substantial portion of their draws made in the period leading up to the firm’s dissolution.  
These claims may be made pursuant to applicable state law.  See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1978) 
(permitting a trustee to void any transfer of the debtor avoidable under state law or pursuant 
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of fraudulent conveyance or preference litigation, or on the basis of the 
unfinished business doctrine, as most famously set forth in the case Jewel v. 
Boxer.278  Under the doctrine of unfinished business, partners who take 
clients and client matters from the old firm to a new firm may have a duty to 
account to the old firm, or in the case of insolvency, the old firm’s creditors, 
for a portion of the fees received.279 
There have been several notable law firm bankruptcies within the past 
decade, almost all of which ended in liquidation and included a fair amount 
of clawback from former partners.  For example, in the bankruptcy of 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP, a firm of over 900 attorneys that 
dissolved and filed an involuntary bankruptcy in 2003, partners eventually 
agreed to the trustee’s demand to return over $22 million.280  Heller Ehrman 
LLP had more than 500 attorneys just before filing its chapter 11 petition in 
response to being declared in default by its major lender.281  Heller’s former 
partners (termed shareholders by the firm) were required to repay an average 
of $100,000 each.282  Perhaps the largest law firm collapse in living memory 
was that of Dewey & Leboeuf LLP in 2012.283  Prior to dissolution, Dewey 
boasted roughly 1,400 attorneys spread throughout twenty-six offices.284  In 
order to obtain a release of claims against them, partners repaid $71.5 
million, with several partners individually paying more than $1 million back 
to the bankruptcy estate.285 
 
 
to bankruptcy-specific provisions permitting the recovery of funds distributed while the 
debtor was insolvent.).  See, also e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 547–48.   
 278  Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171 (1984).   
 279  See Michael D. DeBaecke & Victoria A. Guilfoyle, Law Firm Dissolutions: When the 
Music Stops, Does Anyone Need to Account for Any Unfinished Business?, 14 DEL. L. REV. 
41, 44 (2013) (noting a difference between states as to whether the unfinished business 
doctrine applies to hourly fee matters in addition to contingency fee matters); Christine Hurt, 
The Limited Liability Partnership in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567, 577–86 (2015) 
(detailing application of the Jewel doctrine in recent high-profile law firm bankruptcies).   
 280  See Ribstein, supra note 34, at 771–72.   
 281  See Tom Abate & Andrew S. Ross, Heller Ehrman law firm to dissolve friday, S.F. 
GATE (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Heller-Ehrman-law-firm-to-
dissolve-Friday-3193215.php.   
 282  Heyn, supra note 275, at 14.   
 283  See Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational Form and 
Capitalization Structure, 78 MO. L. REV. 777, 777 (2013).  Those with longer memories 
would also remember Finley Kumble as an industry giant that failed spectacularly.  With 
nearly 700 lawyers at the time of its bankruptcy in 1987, it was by far the largest law firm 
failure of its time.  See E.R. Shipp, Finley, Kumble, Major Law Firm, Facing Revamping or 
Dissolution, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/11/business/
finley-kumble-major-law-firm-facing-revamping-or-dissolution.html.   
 284  Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2012), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/dewey-leboeuf-files-for-bankruptcy/.   
 285  See Heyn, supra note 275.   
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Although each law firm described above failed in slightly different 
ways, they shared a common pattern.  As one author has recognized, law 
firms that failed demonstrated the pattern of “growth for the sake of growth,” 
celebrating “bigness” as a virtue, a characteristic which, as described above, 
is unlikely to be beneficial in the face of technological advance and may in 
fact be a liability.286  As demonstrated by these firms, and by the cases of 
Blockbuster, Borders, and Kodak above, a large, significant investment in 
outdated technology can prove far more costly than beneficial in the face of 
technological innovation.  BigLaw firms should recognize the limited value 
and the very real danger in simply being big. 
In addition, in light of the continual technological advances 
characteristic of our times, BigLaw firms should recognize the danger in 
complacency.  There is evidence that many law firms have seen the 
advantages of artificial intelligence and are investing in its technology, 
although its experimental and potentially threatening nature may provoke 
resistance amongst those firms that have profited under the old model. 287  
This is Kodak’s story, and firms seeking a future would be well-advised not 
to grow too comfortable in an ever-changing present. 
BigLaw firms should also avoid large investment in out-of-date 
technology or its supporting capital structure, analogous to Borders’ 
unprofitable leases.  This could include, unfortunately, investing in 
associates in reliance on the model of churn—individuals who the firm has 
no intention of making a partner and in whom the firm is unwilling to invest 
time and training.  As coveted as BigLaw jobs are now, they may become 
even more competitive, particularly if changes in the type of work and the 
level of firm investment induce more associates to stay at their jobs.  Law 
 
 286  See, e.g., HARPER, supra note 39, at 149 (“Dewey & LeBoeuf had some unique 
problems, including multiyear compensation packages to legacy partners of the merged firms 
and massive debt that included millions in outside investor bonds and outstanding IOUs to 
partners when the firm failed to meet annual profit targets. But it was also a vivid example of 
ubiquitous trends in big law firms: growth for the sake of growth; combining firms without 
respect for their differing cultures; concentrating wealth and power at the top within so-called 
partnerships; eroding a middle class of equity partners who might bring more accountability 
to their firm leaders; using client silos as definitive measures of value; offering expensive 
guaranteed contracts as part of an aggressive lateral hiring approach that undermines 
collegiality and community.”); see also Hurt, supra note 279, at 567 (observing that large, 
brand-name law firms that had filed in recent years “expanded through hiring and mergers, 
took on expensive lease commitments, borrowed large sums of money, and then could not 
meet financial obligations once markets took a downturn and practice groups scattered to 
other firms”).   
 287  See Jane Croft, Artificial intelligence disrupting the business of law, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 
5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/5d96dd72-83eb-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5; George S. 
Bellas, Is the Future of the Practice of Law in Jeopardy?, ATT’YS CREATIVE ROUNDTABLE, 
http://www.attorneyscreativeroundtable.com/is-the-future-of-the-practice-of-law-in-
jeopardy/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2017).   
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schools may do their part to better prepare students for jobs, not just in 
BigLaw but elsewhere, by training students in human interaction as well as 
the cultivation of artificial intelligence.288 
By far, the most important lesson to be derived from these historical 
examples is not to delay in responding to technological disruption.  Value is 
best preserved early, and bankruptcy reorganization proceedings can be most 
effective when there is still sufficient value in the company to justify them.  
For many, the uncertain and unknowable nature of technological advances 
can encourage a state of paralysis.289  Giving into this paralysis will both 
increase the likelihood of requiring bankruptcy proceedings and decrease the 
likelihood that such proceedings will result in a successful reorganization. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Firms fail for a variety of reasons, but as technological advances permit 
the shift of work from professionals to increasingly capable machines,290 it 
is rational to expect a broader range of businesses, including law firms, to 
make adjustments to the new market reality or become uncompetitive.  As 
this Article has demonstrated, companies that were once at the top of their 
industries have been felled by their inability or reluctance to adjust to 
technological disruption.  The tools provided by the Bankruptcy Code are 
intended to permit firms to reassess and redirect assets in order to maximize 
value.  When adopted too late, even these tools are insufficient to save 
companies that have squandered their opportunities for early readjustment.  
For law firms, bankruptcy tools may be particularly ineffective in light of the 
particular constraints associated with law firm capital—attorneys and other 
personnel.  Accordingly, as technology changes, law firms should be 
prepared to make adjustments early on in order to avoid the failure associated 
with unanswered technological disruption. 
 
 
 288 Some law schools have already moved in this direction.  See Christy Burke, Winning 
the battle to teach legal technology and innovation at law schools, LEGAL IT TODAY (Mar. 
17, 2017),  http://burke-company.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/LegalITToday-Winning-
the-battle-to-teach-legal-technology-and-innovation-at-law-schools.pdf.   
 289  See Margolis & Murray, supra note 6, at 2 (“Lawyers from [prior] generations 
remember a time before technology was so ubiquitous[.] . . . They are certainly aware of 
technology, and use it, but are often suspicious of newer technologies and what they have to 
offer.”).   
 290 See RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONS: HOW 
TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS (2015).   
